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Executive Summary
As the UK population ages, and state responsibility for direct provision of  income security, 
housing, and social care declines, individuals are required to take greater responsibility (and 
associated risk) for funding their own needs in retirement.
•	 The financial services industry has developed as a key player in this new world of  welfare, with financial 
products and services becoming increasingly essential in older people’s lives. However, a number of  political, 
socio-demographic, and economic trends point to the need for more innovative and flexible approaches 
to retirement borrowing options; to meet the changing needs of  an increasingly diverse group of  older 
people. Indeed, the income needs and preferences of  those recently retired who wish to remain active while 
potentially carrying mortgage debt into retirement, will vary quite considerably from those of  the long-term 
retired, where advancing age and declining mobility creates an acute need to support independent living and 
care costs. A key challenge for the industry, and others, is thus the development of  products (and advice 
services) that will meet the income needs of  individuals throughout retirement.
•	 This report explores:
 – The drivers of  demand for retirement borrowing while appreciating that customer needs are likely to 
change quite considerably over the next few decades.
 – The financial product options currently available for older people, including conventional mortgage 
borrowing, unsecured consumer borrowing, unregulated borrowing options and equity release, and the 
limitations associated with each of  these ‘options’.
•	 The report provides an overview of  some of  the key issues related to the current retirement borrowing 
landscape, and the challenges facing key stakeholders (financial services industry, regulators, and governments) 
in meeting the changing financial needs and preferences of  older people. We look to examples of  programmes 
and practices overseas where government plays a greater role in enabling the use of  housing equity 
and housing finance, to consider what more the state could do in the UK context to share the risks and 
responsibilities inherent in retirement lending and borrowing.
Drivers of demand for retirement borrowing
•	 There are a number of  factors that will increasingly drive demand for additional sources of  finance in later life 
as individuals take on greater responsibility for securing their financial security and well-being. These include:
 – Demographic shifts – The Office for National Statistics has projected that in England in 2030, compared to 
2010, there will be 51 per cent more people aged 65 and over, and 101 per cent more people aged 85 and 
over. A key consequence of  increased life expectancy is that people will have to manage their retirement 
income and assets over a longer period than past generations, but research suggests that people frequently 
under-estimate how long they will live1 and find it difficult to plan ahead.
1  In 2005, 30 to 39 year olds underestimated their own life expectancy by at least six years (A New Pension Settlement for the Twenty-First Century –  
The Second Report of  the Pensions Commission, 2005, pages 90, 94)
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 – Inadequate pension income – Key contributory factors here include a decline in the number of  people 
saving into occupational pension schemes over the last two decades and the shift from Defined Benefit to 
Defined Contribution schemes. Recent reforms to end compulsory annuitisation are also likely to impact 
on borrowing behaviour. While it will be some time before the full effects of  the reforms will be known, 
there has already been a considerable decrease in annuity sales, suggesting that retirees are opting against a 
guaranteed, secure income for life, with potentially serious implications for their future financial resilience.
 – Servicing outstanding debt – Mortgage debt is increasingly being carried into retirement. In some cases this 
may be a deliberate and manageable income/asset strategy. However, a growing body of  research points 
to the financial strain that this can place on households entering retirement. The maturing of  interest only 
mortgages without repayment plans is also likely to drive demand for options to manage these financial 
difficulties. Research also suggests a fairly significant change in the profile of  unsecured debt, with an 
estimated 1.1 million people over 50 years old reporting problem debt in 2013.
 – Paying for care – People aged 85 and over are the fastest growing section of  the UK population, and the 
group most likely to need care. Significant pressure on local authority budgets for care services means 
individual responsibility for meeting care costs is increasing, and, in light of  the pressure on pensions, 
income alone is rarely sufficient to cover these costs. Increasing demands on older people to self-provide 
with respect to the costs of  social care are therefore likely to be a further driver of  demand for retirement 
borrowing. Products that allow the withdrawal of  housing equity to support care at home are likely to be 
important here.
 – Limited opportunities for trading down – the costs involved in trading down can be prohibitive for less 
well-off  owners, while a lack of  suitable and suitably priced property to facilitate trading down is a further 
barrier. The upheaval involved in moving house later in life coupled with the emotional attachment that 
many people have to their homes, is a further factor suggesting the growing need for borrowing options on 
existing properties. Meanwhile, improving the supply of  suitable housing for older people will remain a key 
policy challenge.
 – Changing attitudes to housing wealth and inheritance – Customer demand for retirement borrowing 
may also be influenced by changing attitudes to housing wealth and inheritance, particularly for successive 
generations of  retirees. Research suggests that younger cohorts are much less inclined to sacrifice their own 
financial needs and preferences in favour of  leaving bequests.
Retirement borrowing options: opportunities and limitations
Conventional mortgage borrowing
•	 The Mortgage Market Review (MMR) implemented significant changes to the Financial Conduct Authority’s 
rules governing the sale and approval of  mortgages to residential consumers. Key changes included the 
implementation of  an affordability assessment, to ensure that borrowers will be able to afford repayments both 
now and into the future of  the loan.
•	 Lenders appear to have responded by adopting a cautious approach to conventional mortgage lending into 
retirement, meaning that older people have experienced limitations to accessing conventional mortgage borrowing.
•	 CML figures show a significant drop in lending to the over 65s since a peak in 2007, while Age UK has reported 
an upsurge in calls about conventional mortgages. The most frequent complaints relate to the application 
by lenders of  an age limit of  70 or 75, or callers being unable to re-mortgage or extend the term of  an 
endowment or interest-only mortgage, even when they can afford the interest on their current mortgage.
Unsecured borrowing
•	 Age is also a potential barrier to many older people seeking to access good quality consumer credit services 
in retirement, with several ‘best-buy’ personal loan products carrying age limits. While credit cards do not 
impose a maximum age criterion (since they are designed as short-term credit), many of  the lead providers 
have minimum income requirements, ranging from £3,000 but with an average of  about £15,000, which could 
exclude many older people.
Executive Summary
7 Consumer Demand for Retirement Borrowing
Unregulated borrowing
•	 With a quarter of  the older population using unsecured credit and, of  those, ten per cent (around 400,000) 
paying over £85 a week to service their debt, there is a risk of  older people being caught in a spiral of  debt, 
with options to repay or restructure debt increasingly limited. Since the financial crash has constrained access 
to credit, lack of  access to affordable credit with mainstream lenders has led many people on low-incomes 
to turn to other sources of  unregulated credit. Unregulated borrowing options include high-cost, short-term 
loans, and there is evidence that the market for high cost credit has expanded to meet the new demand 
stimulated by constraints in the regulated market. The growth in financial exclusion from regulated credit is 
compounded, for older people, by age-restrictions on regulated mortgage lending and personal loans.
Equity Release
•	 Another option for borrowing in later life is equity release. Equity release products are a distinct category 
of  home finance product offered exclusively to older consumers. They enable the release of  housing equity 
without having to sell up and move out, or make repayments by instalment.
•	 While the equity release market remains small, at less than 2 per cent of  the mainstream mortgage market, 
there has been a significant recent increase in sales.
•	 It is possible that recent trends in mainstream lending have fuelled some of  this growth, by limiting the 
availability of  conventional mortgage products for older people, especially older people with lower levels of  
income and assets.
•	 Equity release products might serve to plug some of  the gap left by limited access to conventional mortgage 
borrowing, but they are not suitable for everyone and there remain a number of  supply and demand-side 
barriers to wider up-take.
•	 These findings suggest the need for greater collaboration and a more joined up approach to retirement 
borrowing issues and potential solutions, between industry, regulators and government.
Sharing risk and responsibility for lending in retirement
•	 While the Government has clearly articulated its expectation that the financial services industry will play a 
central role in facilitating retirement finance, questions remain about the extent to which the industry is fully 
equipped to deliver what is expected of  it, and the role that the state should, or could, play, in better enabling 
both the industry and consumers to meet retirement needs more effectively.
•	 Planning for older age now requires the careful negotiation of  a range of  risks and uncertainties, from personal 
life events over which consumers have limited control (including health and disability risks, longevity risks), to 
the market risks associated with financial transactions, especially in respect of  complex, non-discrete products.
•	 In light of  this, we consider, in chapter 3, how other jurisdictions have approached the question of  risk-sharing 
between the state and the market for meeting people’s retirement borrowing needs in the context of  housing  
wealth decumulation.
•	 In the US, lifetime mortgages sold under the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) programme are 
insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which protects lenders against the risk that the loan 
balance may eventually exceed the value of  the property. The insurance premium also guarantees that if  
the lender goes out of  business, the government will ensure that borrowers still have access to their loan 
funds. Following the US example, a similar programme was developed in South Korea, which introduced the 
Jootaekyeonkeum ( JTYK) reverse mortgage under the Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC) Act in 2007.
•	 The state-backed guarantees offered in the US and South Korean markets enable lenders to offer lower 
interest rates and relatively large payments compared with the non-state-backed products offered in the UK. 
Such initiatives could improve the perception of  poor value for money that surrounds equity release products 
in the UK.
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•	 In a number of  other ways, East Asian countries such as Japan and Singapore have sought to strengthen the 
contribution of  home ownership to meeting older people’s income needs. In Japan, for instance, recognition 
of  considerable reluctance among older people to trade down led to the establishment of  the ‘house moving 
support scheme for the elderly’ in 2006, while in Singapore, the Housing and Development Board (HDB) 
launched its Lease Buyback Scheme (LBS) in 2009; enabling owners of  homes with three or less rooms to sell 
some of  the remaining years of  their lease to the HBD in return for a lifelong supplement to their income.
•	 In some European countries, such as Poland, released equity in income form is not subject to income tax, as in 
the UK, thereby facilitating the use of  housing equity as a regular supplement to pension income.
•	 These overseas programmes and practices provide an illustration of  the potential role that the state can play 
in supporting the retirement borrowing sector through greater risk sharing and facilitation. In the UK, the state 
plays a significant role in subsidising mortgage borrowing for working age people (for example, under Right 
to Buy schemes, Help to Buy, Funding for Lending scheme, Key Workers scheme, and so on), yet to date, 
governments have relied largely on the financial services industry to manage the risks and costs of  equity lending 
in retirement. With policies geared towards encouraging more people to make use of  the equity tied up in their 
own homes, to support themselves and remain financially secure after retirement, there is a case to be made for 
the state to rethink its role in sharing some of  the risks associated with housing finance for older people.
Gaps in the knowledge base
How are older people meeting their borrowing needs and preferences in retirement?
•	 There is relatively little evidence regarding what people do when excluded from conventional secured borrowing. 
Are people turning to:
 – equity release;
 – higher-cost, higher risk, options;
 – or are they going without?
Product development
•	 What do consumers want and need? Is it better access to conventional mortgage borrowing, equity release, 
or something in between? There has been some development of  so-called hybrid products that offer a bridge 
between traditional lifetime mortgages where the debt rolls up over the course of  the loan, and those that allow 
interest to be part paid/part rolled, but we currently lack knowledge and understanding of  the appetite for 
these products. Are there other options? And what are the challenges with regard to funding and distribution?
•	 What are the particular features that would make retirement borrowing products more attractive, and what 
are people prepared to pay for?
Advice
•	 How do people make decisions about retirement income and assets, particularly in the pension freedom environment?
•	 What are the challenges in providing advice aligned with the changing pattern of  spending in retirement?
•	 How can holistic advice be given in a way that makes sense to the customer and engages them into thinking 
about their future tax, care costs and legal needs?
Greater risk sharing and a more joined up approach to borrowing in retirement
•	 What do stakeholders (i.e. government, regulators, and lenders) think about a more joined-up approach to 
retirement lending? Is there an appetite for risk-sharing options, to support better outcomes for consumers 
and to reduce costs and risks to lenders?
•	 What lessons can be learned from other countries where the state plays a more active role in encouraging and 
enabling the use of  housing equity in later life?
Executive Summary
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Drivers of  Demand for Retirement 
Borrowing
1.1 Introduction
Financial services and products are becoming increasingly essential in older people’s lives. As the UK population 
ages, and state responsibility for direct provision of  income security, housing, and social care declines, individuals 
are required to take greater responsibility (and associated risk) for funding their own needs in retirement.
The Office for National Statistics has projected that in England in 2030, compared to 2010, there will be 51 per 
cent more people aged 65 and over, and 101 per cent more people aged 85 and over. A key consequence of  
increased life expectancy is that people will have to manage their retirement income and assets over a longer 
period than past generations, but research suggests that people frequently under-estimate how long they will 
live2 and find it difficult to plan ahead (Finney and Hayes, 2015). Furthermore, research indicates that retirement 
may follow a ‘u-shaped’ spending curve, with people tending to spend more in the early, more active years of  
retirement, spending decreasing in the middle years, and then increasing again with additional care and medical 
expenses. Again, however, individuals do not tend to plan for it and financial products and services do not 
necessarily cater for this pattern of  spending (Age UK, 2014a, p. 11).
These difficulties have been compounded by the global financial crisis and subsequent recession which have 
constrained access to credit while increasing the cost of  living. Research for Age UK has indicated that low returns 
from savings, decreasing annuity rates and rising prices for energy and other basic costs are adding to the financial 
pressures on older people, with more than 3 million people over the age of  50 reporting that they are ‘very 
worried’ about the cost of  living (TNS, 2015).
At the same time, levels of  home ownership and housing wealth remain relatively high among older cohorts. 
In 2011, 76 per cent of  households (England and Wales) with the head of  household aged 65-74, and 73 per 
cent aged 75 or over, were owner-occupiers (PPI, 2014), while the House of  Lords Select Committee on Public 
Service and Demographic Change estimated that people over state pension age in 2009 owned roughly £250bn  
in housing wealth that was ‘available’ to be released (House of  Lords, 2013).
The combination of  these political, socio-demographic, and economic trends highlight the need for innovative 
and flexible approaches to retirement products (and the associated, and essential nature, of  planning and advice 
services), to enable more older people to bridge the increasing gap between income and needs in later life.  
This chapter outlines key factors driving demand for retirement borrowing.
1.2. Drivers of demand for retirement borrowing
1.2.1 Inadequate pension income
Although recent reforms to the State Pension3 are likely to increase the level of  income that some pensioners 
receive from the state system in the future, current levels of  state and private provision remain relatively 
low, with the Department for Work and Pensions estimating that 12.2 million people are facing inadequate 
2  In 2005, 30 to 39 year olds underestimated their own life expectancy by at least six years (A New Pension Settlement for the Twenty-First Century –  
The Second Report of  the Pensions Commission, 2005, pages 90, 94). 
3 For example, the reduction in the number of  qualifying years for both men and women to be eligible for a full Basic Sate Pension and raising the state  
pension each year in line with prices, earnings or 2.5 per cent, whichever is highest. This has been termed the ‘Triple Lock’.
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retirement incomes (DWP, 2013). A key contributory factor here is a decline in the number of  people saving 
into occupational pension schemes over the last two decades (See Figure 1), as well as a shift from Defined 
Benefit to Defined Contribution schemes. In 2013, the average employer contribution rate for private sector 
DB occupational schemes was 15.4 per cent, while for DC schemes it was 6.1 per cent (ONS, 2014). With DC 
retirement income being dependent on stock market performance and annuity rates at the time of  purchase, 
savers also face considerable uncertainty over the eventual size of  their pension pot. Annuity rates have fallen 
significantly over the last 25 years, so that even sizeable pots amount to only very modest annual incomes: an 
individual who wanted to start retirement with a nominal income of  £10,000 would have needed a pension pot of  
£65,000 in 1990, but over £175,000 by 2013 (Lowe, 2014).
Figure 1.1 Number of active scheme members (million)
Source: ILC UK (2014), p.18.
While income from private pensions now accounts for a similar proportion of  the average gross income of  
retired households as the state pension (41 and 38 per cent respectively in 2010/11), (ONS, 2012), increases in 
private pension saving have tended to be concentrated among the better off; many UK pensioners, particularly 
single women, continue to rely on state pensions and related benefits as an important component of  retirement 
income (ONS, 2013a). Furthermore, women’s traditionally lower levels of  paid employment, earnings and 
membership of  private pension schemes (Hills et al, 2010) continue to affect pension income levels: in 2012-13, 
the average gross weekly income of  single female pensioners was £298 compared to £350 for single men (DWP, 
2014a), and around two fifths of  women aged 55-64 have no private pension entitlement at all (Age UK, 2014a).
A lack of  sufficient private pension saving led the Coalition Government, based in part on recommendations from 
the Pension Commission (2006), to introduce auto-enrolment into non-state pensions. This will go some way 
to increasing the number of  people saving into a private pension: By October 2014, 4.8 million people had been 
auto-enrolled, and opt-out rates have been lower than expected (DWP, 2014b). However, with contributions set 
to increase to a relatively modest 4 per cent for the employee, 3 per cent for the employer and 1 per cent in tax 
relief  by 2018, savings levels are likely to remain low, with the gap between pension income and needs continuing 
into the future.
1.2.2 Private pension reforms and the end of compulsory annuitisation
In March 2014, the Government announced that all people with DC savings over the minimum pension age 
would no longer be required to purchase an annuity or a drawdown product in order to access their DC savings 
(from April 2015). This allows retirees to withdraw their DC savings in unlimited amounts, taxed at an individual’s 
marginal rate (with 25 per cent of  the amount withdrawn tax free) (PP1, 2014). While it will be some time before 
the full effects of  the recent pension reforms will be known, we are already witnessing a considerable decrease in 
annuity sales (see Figure 1.2), suggesting that retirees are opting against a guaranteed, secure income, for life, with 
potentially serious implications for their future financial resilience.
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Figure 1.2 Annuity sales by quarter 2013-2014 Q1-3
Source: Pensions Policy Institute (2014), p. 28, based on ABI statistics.
If  these trends continue and more people use or invest their pension lump sums in the first few years of  retirement, 
they will need to find alternative sources of  income or borrowing later on. Inadequate pension income is therefore 
likely to be one of, if  not the most significant, drivers of  demand for additional sources of  finance in later life, but a 
more recent trend – increasing indebtedness in retirement – is also likely to play a role here.
1.2.3 Servicing outstanding debt
The Prudential’s (2013) retirement survey estimated that in 2013, one in five people would retire with outstanding 
debts, 43 per cent of  whom would have outstanding mortgage debts. Within this figure, there was a slight 
decrease in mortgage debt, but more people retiring with large amounts of  consumer debt in the form of  credit 
cards and overdrafts.
1.2.3.1 Mortgage debt
Changing patterns of  mortgage management since the 1980s have fundamentally changed the retirement 
borrowing landscape in the UK. Home acquisition mortgages were traditionally granted for a term calculated 
to end by the time the mortgagor reached retirement age, to coincide with expectations regarding the ability 
to pay. Before the credit crunch, product innovation led to the development of  a range of  products to facilitate 
secured lending to older people. New features, including longer terms (of  up to 50 years or longer), interest-
only mortgages, and the growth in mortgage-equity withdrawal (MEW) – using flexible options on an existing 
mortgage, or re-mortgaging – had the potential to offer greater flexibility for borrowing during working lives 
and into retirement, as well as increased risk. The Family Resources Survey (2009-10) found that 34 per cent of  
homeowners who were still repaying a mortgage had borrowed equity from their homes at some point since they 
purchased them, a rise of  8.4 per cent since 1994-5.4
Since 2007, access to mortgage finance in retirement has been significantly constrained. Yet, more people are 
carrying mortgage debt into retirement, with forecasts indicating that this trend is likely to grow. Research by 
the PFRC and ILC UK (Collard and Hayes, 2014) shows that one in five (21 per cent) older households (defined 
as households headed by someone aged 50 years and over) had outstanding mortgage borrowing on their main 
home in 2008-10, owing an average amount of  over £62,0005. Data published by the Council of  Mortgage 
Lenders has demonstrated that the proportion of  mortgage loans expected to extend beyond the age of  65 is 
continuing to increase, and is approaching 35 per cent (CML, 2015). And while mortgage borrowing and the 
amounts that households owe reduce steadily with increasing age (see Table 1.1), half  of  all oldest households 
(75 years and over) owed more than £21,000, and a quarter owed the equivalent of  25 per cent or more of  the 
estimated value of  their home (Collard and Hayes, 2014). The number of  over 60s approaching StepChange 
4 http://wealthgap.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2013/02/WealthGap_No_01_Equity_Borrowing.pdf  
5 The analysis excluded equity release products.
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Debt Charity for mortgage help went up by around 40 per cent between 2009 and 2012 (Age UK/ILC UK, 2013), 
indicating the difficulties that some older people are facing in servicing these debt repayments. It should also be 
noted, however, that carrying mortgage debt into retirement is not necessarily a source of  financial strain, with 
many older households reporting that they are able to keep up with the mortgage payments on their main home 
(Collard and Hayes, 2014). For those that are not, or find them a heavy burden, age per se is not a key factor. The 
factors that most strongly predict mortgage difficulties include households’ levels of  savings and investments; and 
levels of  non-mortgage borrowing (e.g. credit cards and personal loans) (Collard and Hayes, 2014).
Table 1.1: Amount owed and percentage loan-to-value among older households with any outstanding mortgage borrowing on the main 
residence, by age of household reference person (HRP) or their partner
Age of HRP  
or partner
Amount outstanding 
(Mean £) 
Other type
Unweighted base
Amount outstanding 
(Median £) Loan-to-value (%)
50 to 54 72,000 50,000 38 916
55 to 59 59,700 40,000 27 687
60 to 64 53,200 31,200 25 419
65 to 69 55,200 40,000 44 145
70 to 74* 45,900 22,700 21 91
75 and over*  30,900  21,000 19 75
All aged over 50 62,200 40,000 30 2,333
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey 2008-10, as quoted in Colard and Hayes (2014). Base is all mortgaged households headed by someone aged 50 and 
over. Figures are rounded to the nearest 100. *Treat with Caution due to small base size (<100 cases).
1.2.3.2 Interest-only mortgages
In addition to the demands of  mortgage debt repayments by instalment, a further source of  concern relates to 
interest-only mortgages, where the borrower does not have a strategy in place to repay the capital at the end of  
the term. Again, however, for those that do have a plan in place, borrowing on an interest only basis can provide 
a suitable and beneficial way of  meeting income needs. But the FCA thematic review of  interest-only mortgages 
found that 600,000 interest only mortgages will mature over the next seven years, with almost half  of  all 
borrowers needing more time to repay (FCA, 2013). Around 40,000 households aged 65+ will see their interest-
only mortgage mature between 2017 and 2032, and half  of  these households will have a shortfall of  more than 
£50,000. While many of  these older households will have plans for repayment, some plans may be derailed by 
having to give up work earlier than expected because of  ill-health or due to caring responsibilities. One in 10 
endowment mortgage holders have no repayment plans, and in the years up to 2020, one-third of  endowment 
shortfalls are expected to be over £50,000. Amongst the over-50s, older cohorts are more likely to have non-
repayment mortgages, including interest only mortgages with no linked investment (see Table 1.2).
CML monitors the evolving profile of  the interest-only back book. Its most recent data (autumn 2015) estimates 
the total book as at the end of  2014 at some 1.9 million pure interest-only mortgages; 480,000 of  which are set 
to mature on or before 2020.
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Table 1.2 Types of mortgage held on the main home among older mortgaged households, by age group of HRP or their partner
Age group of  
HRP or partner Repayment (%)†
Other type
Unweighted base
Any other type 
(includng interest-only 
(%)
Unlinked interest-only 
(%)‡
50 to 54 67 36 6 916
55 to 59 64 38 8 687
60 to 64 53 48 11 419
65 to 69 54 48 15 145
70 to 74* 42 59 32 91
75 and over* 34 66 40 75
All aged over 50 61 41 10 2,333
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey 2008-10, as quoted in Colard and Hayes (2014). Base is all mortgaged households headed by someone aged 50 and 
over. Figures are rounded to the nearest 100. *Treat with Caution due to small base size (<100 cases). Notes †Inlcudes all in one or (or offset) mortgages. 
‡Comprises all mortgages linked to an endowment policy (inlcuding part-repayment, part-endowment), PEP, Unit trust, ISA or other investment, a pension 
mortgage, and interest only mortgages without a linked investment.
The Financial Conduct Authority has warned that providers cannot penalise older customers who are trapped 
with interest-only mortgages; but limited options in the regulated credit market reduce older people’s freedom 
to shop around for a new product to re-finance, in the way that younger people can. As such, the problem of  
maturing interest-only mortgages is likely to be exacerbated by lack of  access to further mortgage finance, as 
arbitrary age limits can make it difficult to extend a loan or re-mortgage. Linda Woodall, Director of  Mortgage 
and Consumer Lending at the FCA has reiterated the Authority’s support for lenders to help ‘perfectly credit-
worthy existing mortgage borrowers’ (FCA, 2015a), by allowing these existing borrowers to move to a new deal 
with them. Woodall noted that while low mortgage rates have provided a number of  borrowers with breathing 
space, and it is unlikely that rates will move up very quickly, many borrowers will find any increase difficult to 
manage. She concluded by emphasising that there is scope within the FCA rules for lenders to give credit worthy 
borrowers who are unable to re-mortgage the opportunity to protect themselves from rates rises, and urging all 
firms to look more closely at their interpretation of  the rules to see whether they are really delivering the right 
outcomes for consumers.
1.2.3.3 Unsecured debt: consumer credit and cost of living
Research also suggests a fairly significant change in the profile of  unsecured debt, with those who have debt in 
retirement now owing considerably more than they did fifteen years ago (McKay et al, 2008). The rate of  growth 
in unsecured debt between 1995 and 2005 was fastest for those aged 55 to 59 (increasing almost five times) and 
those aged 60 to 64 (where four times as much was owed in 2005 as in 1995) (McKay et al, 2008). More recent 
analysis shows that one in four people aged 50 and over have non-mortgage borrowing, each owing an average 
of  £4,500 (Collard and Hayes, 2014). These trends may reflect ‘baby boomers’ changing lifestyles and attitudes 
to consumption, as well as ease of  access to credit (with the exception of  the last few years), but the changes 
are also linked to lower income (pensions and savings), rising living costs, and the crunch on credit leaving people 
struggling to make ends meet.
Even before the financial crisis which started in 2007-08, about 25 per cent of  people approaching retirement age 
had consumer debts, with some increases in the propensity for credit use after the age of  60 and again after 65 
(Help the Aged, 2008). In 2013, an estimated 1.1m people over 50 years old were in problem debt, with one in 
five people retiring in 2013 carrying an average debt of  £31,200 and more than one in 10 believing they would 
never be able to repay that debt (Prudential, 2013).
One consequence of  growing indebtedness amongst the older population has been an increase in bankruptcy. 
In 2013, bankruptcy rates among over 65s rose by 470 per cent to 1,972 people, making pensioners the 
fastest growing group of  bankrupts. Increasing consumer and mortgage debt into retirement; limited access to 
conventional mortgages and good quality personal finance products in retirement; and the high costs of  servicing 
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consumer debt; combine with a bankruptcy landscape in which alternatives to personal insolvency (for example, 
the Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVA) or other debt management arrangements) are unlikely to be available 
to older debtors, who are much less likely to have predictable future income and expenses than the population  
as a whole.
1.2.4 Paying for care
As we saw at the beginning of  this chapter, one of  the most pronounced demographic changes in the 20th 
century and into the 21st Century has been the significant increase in average life expectancy. In the UK, the 
number of  people aged 85 and over increased by 30 per cent between 2005 and 2014 (ONS, 2013b). However, 
healthy life expectancy has not kept pace with the overall increase in life expectancy (particularly for men), with 
those aged 85 and over being most likely to need care. Government spending on social care has fallen by £770 
million since 2010, and waiting times for care home places, home care, and adaptations have increased (Age UK, 
2014b). These changes reflect local authority funding pressures, leading many councils to raise eligibility thresholds 
for care funding contributions. By 2012, 85 per cent of  local authorities had set their eligibility threshold for 
adult social care at ‘substantial’, with a further 2 per cent setting their threshold at ‘critical’. Only a minority now 
pay for people with low and moderate care needs (Age UK, 2014c, p.8). Significant pressure on local authority 
budgets for care services increases individual responsibility for meeting care costs; and, in light of  the pressure on 
retirement income, discussed above, income alone is rarely sufficient to cover these costs.
Increasing demands on older people to self-provide with respect to the costs of  social care are therefore likely 
to be a further driver of  demand for retirement borrowing; products that allow the withdrawal of  housing 
equity to support care at home are likely to be of  most importance here. Indeed, evidence suggests that when 
people need care, they prefer to stay in their own homes (Heywood et al, 2002). In a recent study of  equity 
release consumers (Overton and Fox O’Mahony, 2015), participants unanimously agreed that care at home was 
preferable to care in an institutional setting, with the majority saying that they would be willing to use their own 
resources, including housing equity, for this purpose.
It does seem to me that older people want to stay in their homes when they get old and 
their health isn’t good…I think it’s better for the individual, but also I think it’s better for 
society that people can stay in their home with the support that they need… I think we 
would feel that’s [paying for domiciliary care] a legitimate reason to draw down the money 
[release more equity] Like to pay for home help or even an adaptation or something like 
that with the bathroom. (Male, age 76)
All the while I can look after myself I shall continue to do so. But if I needed a little bit of 
help to come in occasionally and that has to be paid for, then so be it…That would be a 
legitimate use of my resources. (Male, age 75)
Furthermore, the Care Act 2014 implemented a cap on the cost of  long-term care with the hope that having a 
clearer idea of  what people may need to provide for would make it easier for them to plan ahead (Commission 
on Funding of  Care and Support, 2011). The Act was also underpinned by an assumption that the cap would 
create demand for new financial products to help people to manage their long-term care costs (Department 
of  Health, 2013). However, there is a current lack of  suitable product vehicles enabling older people to plan 
ahead for the costs of  care, or pay for care at the point of  use. The Universal Deferred Payment Scheme, for 
example, is set to apply only to care in an institutional setting, while commercial equity release products come to 
an end when someone moves into long-term care. This leaves open the opportunity for product development, 
particularly products that draw on housing equity to service domiciliary care costs.
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1.2.5 ‘Trading down’ vs. ‘ageing in place’: affordability and suitability
In theory, one option for older owners with financial needs after retirement would be ‘trading down’ to a lower 
value property; however, there are limited opportunities for this in the current UK housing market. For older 
homeowners, trading down might not always be possible or, indeed, desirable, for a number of  reasons. Firstly, 
there can be significant costs involved in moving house. The Pensions Policy Institute (2009) estimated that 
downsizing from a property worth £350,000 to one worth £230,000 in order to release £120,000 could cost 
somewhere in the region of  £13,100 when the costs of  stamp duty, surveys, legal fees and so forth are taken into 
account. Secondly, a recent study has found that decisions to ‘age-in-place’ are also influenced by a lack of  suitable 
(and suitably-priced) alternative housing options (Fox O’Mahony & Overton, 2014a). Less well-off  consumers, in 
particular, indicated that there was a lack of  suitable alternatives in their price range, leaving them with no choice 
but to release equity in situ. In several cases this was because they had already downsized to their current property. 
Finally, many people do not want to move house in later life due to the upheaval involved and/or because they 
want to remain in familiar surroundings; close to social networks (Fox O’Mahony and Overton, 2014a).
However, a recent online YouGov poll (December 2014) of  1,459 homeowners aged 55 and over (on behalf   
of  the National Housing Federation) indicated that homes are not suitable for ageing in place. Just over half   
(52 per cent) of  those surveyed think that their current home is unfit for living with care needs or mobility 
problems, while 38 per cent reported that their home would need to be adapted. Only a quarter said that their 
home would be suitable in the event of  mobility problems or in case they became ill to the point of  needing 
care6. With specialist retirement housing comprising just 2 per cent of  the UK housing stock, or 533,000 homes, 
with just over 100,000 to buy (Wood, 2013); and older people potentially having to compete with first-time 
buyers for other smaller houses and flats, there is a continued and growing need for borrowing options on 
existing properties. Meanwhile, improving the supply of  suitable housing for older people will remain a key policy 
challenge (ILC UK, 2014).
1.2.6 Changing attitudes to housing wealth and inheritance
Customer demand for retirement borrowing may also be influenced by changing attitudes to housing wealth and 
inheritance. Research by Smith (2004) examined people’s attitudes to retirement, their financial plans and whether 
they might use their housing wealth in the future. She found that although the majority of  respondents thought 
that they would rely on pensions and spouses’ incomes as the main sources of  retirement income, 52 per cent 
of  mortgage holders in the 45-54 age group and 46 per cent of  outright owners said they were likely to draw 
on housing equity. This is in contrast to 23 per cent and 37 percent of  mortgage holders and outright owners 
in the 65-80 year old age group which indicates that support for using housing wealth in older age is greater 
among those who have not yet retired. Just Retirement (2012) found a similar pattern, with changing attitudes 
to inheritance more pronounced among younger cohorts. While they found that people who were ‘established 
retired’ or ‘long-term retired’ were more likely to have a strong bequest motive, even if  this meant going without 
during their retirement, those approaching retirement were much less inclined to sacrifice their own income 
needs and preferences in order to leave an inheritance. It is possible that there is an ageing effect here, with 
people’s attitudes to inheritance altering as they age and their circumstances change. For example, as Rowlingson 
and McKay (2005, p.42) suggested, people in their 50s and 60s may decide they want to enjoy life more than they 
had previously thought, but as they progress into later life and reach their 70s and 80s, they may become more 
closely integrated with their families again, perhaps through grandparenthood or receiving care, and with the 
ability to cruise around the world declining, support for inheritance and the idea of  leaving some kind of  legacy 
after they die may return. However, without panel data on this subject, it is difficult to know if  this is generally the 
case. It is also possible that differences in attitudes among the younger old, and the older old, age groups are the 
result of  a cohort or generation effect. The baby boom generation(s) may well have different attitudes to family 
and money than older generations who experienced the second world war and lived through more austere times 
(Rowlingson and McKay, 2005).
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Commissioning/?&msg=0&parent=3693&child=9541
16 Consumer Demand for Retirement Borrowing
Alongside changing attitudes to inheritance, there has also been a shift in attitudes towards responsibility for 
income needs in retirement. Rowlingson (2006) found that while most participants wanted to leave some of  their 
estate as an inheritance, they acknowledged that their incomes in later life were likely to be fairly low. Rather than 
expecting the state to resolve this by increasing pension incomes, the participants in her study expected that they 
might have to draw on the equity in their homes to maintain a reasonable standard of  living.
As well as meeting their own welfare needs, there is also evidence to indicate that some older owners are using 
their housing wealth to support their children financially. This was a key finding in a study of  UK equity release 
consumers (Overton, 2010) where 26 per cent of  those surveyed had taken out equity release primarily to pass 
on some of  their housing wealth to children or grandchildren. This group of  consumers had used equity release as 
a strategy for asset transfer on the basis that their longevity would reduce the benefits to their children, and also 
so they would receive more benefit by being able to see the impact it had on their families’ lives. Timing is a factor 
that a number of  researchers have pointed to in explaining the changing nature and pattern of  inheritance. Izuhara 
(2005), for example, suggests that as people live longer they may increasingly decide to make early bequests, 
since by the time they die their children are more likely to be established in terms of  employment, housing, and so 
forth, and are therefore less likely to need the inheritance compared to when they were younger. Recent analysis 
by ILC UK (2014) found that the average age of  a first time buyer without family assistance is now 33 compared 
with 30 in 2008, pointing to the growing importance of  this type of  support, and to the potentially increasing 
demand among older people for mechanisms enabling them to provide financial transfers.
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CHAPTER 2 
Retirement Borrowing Options – 
Opportunities and Limitations
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we provide an overview of  the financial product options currently available for older people, 
including conventional mortgage borrowing, unsecured consumer borrowing, unregulated borrowing options and 
equity release (lifetime mortgages and home reversions).
We discuss the limitations on access to these borrowing ‘options’, and consider the implications for older people’s 
access to borrowing, with knock-on effects for their financial security. We also identify a number of  barriers 
inhibiting market growth in some areas (e.g. equity release) and the impact of  exclusion issues (including age 
and income/asset levels). Finally, we consider how the patchwork of  barriers to, and restrictions on, retirement 
borrowing has narrowed the field of  options within the regulated market, with implications for the shape and size 
of  the market for later life borrowing.
2.2 Conventional mortgage borrowing
As we noted in Chapter One, for many people seeking to realise equity or raise cash, trading down is either not 
an option, or not an attractive option, leading them to look instead to the credit market. The development of  
innovative mortgage products has played a significant role in disrupting the traditional picture of  owner-occupiers 
reaching retirement, having discharged their mortgage, as outright owners, and ready to exit the borrowing 
market. Increasingly, older people are carrying mortgage and non-mortgage debt into retirement, either as part 
of  a deliberate income and asset management strategy7, or through little choice, in which case, putting increasing 
financial strain on household budgets as income drops. In addition, as noted in Chapter One, this has coincided 
with a range of  factors – new drivers, including income needs and higher expectations of  lifestyle in retirement, 
and the normalisation of  flexible borrowing – which have generated new demand for retirement borrowing 
services. Yet, for older borrowers looking to the conventional mortgage market, supply has been drastically 
curtailed in the wake of  the global financial crisis and the (then) FSA’s Mortgage Market Review.
2.2.1 Mortgage Market Review and post-Global Financial Crisis financial regulation
The Mortgage Market Review (MMR) (FSA, 2011) implemented significant changes to the Financial Conduct 
Authority’s rules governing the sale and approval of  mortgages to residential consumers. Key changes included the 
implementation of  an affordability assessment, requiring lenders to verify income in every mortgage application, 
including stress-testing interest rate changes and considering major outgoings such as heating and council tax, to 
ensure that borrowers will be able to afford repayments both now and into the future of  the loan.
The MMR identified mortgage terms that extend into retirement as ‘high-risk’, on the basis that income may not be 
sufficient for mortgage servicing after the consumer retires, and highlighted a need for more rigorous assessment 
of  affordability, with specific consideration given to lending beyond state pension age. In shaping its approach to 
retirement lending, the FSA explicitly stated that it did not wish to encourage an ‘excessively cautious approach on 
the part of  lenders, thus restricting the availability and increasing the cost of  mortgages into retirement.’
7 See research by Policis which reports that around half  of  mortgagors over fifty (53%) now have mortgages that stretch past age 65 with almost two thirds of  
this age range (65%), overall, intending to borrow into retirement to support their financial plans for later life (https://policis.com/pdf/Mortgages/New%20
Approaches%20to%20Mortgage%20Regulation%20and%20MMR%20final%20151110.pdf )
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‘Our aim is to protect consumers from carrying foreseeably unaffordable debt into retirement. 
We do not want to prevent older consumers from accessing mortgages where they have the 
means to support the mortgage. So we are proposing that lenders should adopt a prudent 
and proportionate approach to assessing income beyond state pension age. This means that 
lenders may take a higher-level approach where retirement is a long way off, for example by 
requesting evidence of the existence of pension provision. Where retirement is closer, however, 
lenders might be expected to take more robust steps, for example by considering projections 
on pension statements.’ (FCA, 2011 [CP11/31]: 1.76)
The Mortgage Market Review recognised the need for lenders to tailor their criteria to meet the needs of  a 
diverse population of  older consumers, noting respondent feedback that ‘[some] consumers carry unaffordable 
levels of  debt into retirement, while others with more than adequate resources to sustain mortgages into 
retirement are refused mortgages because of  their age’. It therefore recommended that lenders assess 
affordability on a case-by-case basis, making an informed lending decision, based on appropriate evidence  
(FSA, 2011: 3.292-3.298).
2.2.2 Limitations on access to mortgage borrowing following MMR and GFC regulation
2.2.2.1 Age limits, discrimination and exclusion
In practice, the majority of  lenders have responded to the GFC and MMR by adopting a cautious approach to 
conventional mortgage lending into retirement. In 2007, most banks and building societies were willing to lend 
money on a mortgage with a maximum age on repayment of  up to 85. Following the financial crisis, some lenders 
reduced their maximum lending limits for conventional borrowing, and refocused retirement borrowing towards 
their retirement product ranges. 
In addition to explicit maximum age criteria on conventional mortgage products, some apply additional criteria: 
for example, requiring borrowers who want their loan to run into retirement to have a private pension, regardless 
of  their other savings and assets. It is therefore not surprising that since a peak in the second half  of  2007, CML 
figures show a significant decrease in borrowing by those aged 65 and over in both the number and value of  loans 
(see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1 Borrowing by those aged 65 and over, by volume and value (£bn)
Source: CML, data provided in personal communication.
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Age UK has also reported an upsurge in calls about conventional mortgages. Some of  these calls reveal further 
evidence of  access issues for older people, with the most frequent complaints relating to the application by 
lenders of  an age limit of  70 or 75, or callers being unable to re-mortgage or extend the term of  an endowment 
or interest-only mortgage, even if  they can afford the interest on their current mortgage.
The following anonymised quotes help to illustrate these experiences:
“Iwasamazedtofindtodaythatasacurrenthomeowner,althoughIwasapprovedfora
small mortgage on line, when I went to branch they advised me that banks will not offer 
mortgages that extend beyond a person’s 75th birthday.”
“ Caller and husband have an endowment mortgage with £139,000 outstanding which is 
due in March. The mortgage company says it won’t re-mortgage and referred the caller to 
Money Advice Service and Age UK.”
“Callerhasaninterest-onlymortgageof£30,000andisseekingfurtherfinancialassistance
of £3,000 to make housing improvements… Caller told that the rules have changed and 
caller cannot access further £3,000 unless she changes to a repayment mortgage, which 
wouldincreasehermonthlyrepaymentstoafigurecallerfeelswouldbeunmanageable.”
 (Age UK, 2015)
Thus, while some older people may have been lent money that they cannot afford to repay (Chapter One), 
others do not have access to the loans they need. From the lender’s perspective, the potential risk of  default may 
be higher where the borrower’s ability to repay is significantly curtailed by a drop in income during the repayment 
period, for example, on retirement, which could render the mortgage unaffordable. On the other hand, the 
exclusion of  older people from access to conventional mortgage products – particularly under a ‘blanket ban’ 
based on age rather than individual affordability assessments – has implications for their access to mainstream, 
affordable credit. Age UK have raised concerns that it is unfair that those older people who can afford to service 
a loan in later life should be forced into higher-cost borrowing, or equity release (often offered by niche lenders), 
because they are excluded from the wider marketplace (Age UK, 2015).
Age UK recommend that the FCA review mortgage availability for the over 70s; noting that this is particularly 
timely in the context of  the new pension freedoms, as industry anxiety about conventional mortgage debt after 
retirement may lead some lenders to steer people towards using their pensions to repay a mortgage, even if  it is 
not in their best interests to do so.
These experiences of  exclusion among older people have also led Age UK to suggest that it may be timely for the 
FCA to review the financial services industry exception in the Equality Act 2010. Under section 5 of  the Act, ‘Age’ 
was identified as a ‘protected characteristic’, and Part 3 of  the Act makes it unlawful for providers of  services and 
products to discriminate on grounds of  age. However, financial services were excluded from the scope of  the 
Act, allowing financial service providers to assess risk, decide prices, and use age bands and age limits on specific 
products and services, so long as the approach is based on relevant information from a reasonably reliable source. 
This allows prices and products to vary where this is in line with risk or costs and not arbitrary; where ‘it can be 
justified by data showing that it fairly reflects the varying risk profiles of  different age groups.’
Following its consultation on the draft Equality Act, the Government Equality Office concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence of  harmful age discrimination in this area to justify increased legislative intervention, and 
that financial service providers (such as banks, insurance companies, credit reference agencies) could continue 
to use age in the provision of  financial services. ‘Harmful age discrimination’ might be understood as differences 
in treatment which are arbitrary, or which result in financial exclusion for older people. The GEO concluded that 
these issues fall within the remit of  the FCA, under its rules and guidance about treating customers fairly. The FCA 
is therefore charged, through its existing regulatory jurisdiction over the financial services industry, with addressing 
any real or perceived problems linked to harmful age discrimination.
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Implications of restricting conventional mortgage lending into retirement for lenders
One consequence for lenders of  tighter lending criteria is a reduction in the volume of  regulated mortgage 
transactions: age limits on the repayment term require repayments to be profiled over a shorter period; while 
accelerated repayment schedules to avoid lending beyond retirement mean higher instalments, which can render 
lending unaffordable in the short-term. As noted above, this has implications for consumers, who are – sometimes 
unnecessarily – excluded from the regulated mortgage market; but it also has implications for policy goals which 
seek to encourage people to save for their retirement through the accumulation of  housing equity during working 
lives. The Intermediary Mortgage Lenders Association (IMLA) has argued that the MMR does not allow lenders 
to trade-off  between repayment risk (affordability) and underpinning security (LTV ratio). From a prudential 
perspective, the over-weighting of  repayment risk relative to LTV ratio within the overall risk profile of  a loan 
book could actually raise overall risk profile, if  providers decline business that carried a lower overall risk than 
repayment risk alone would suggest (IMLA, 2014).
Another factor highlighted by the IMLA is that, with most private sector employees now holding defined 
contribution (DC) pensions, many customers are not in a position to know what their pension income will 
be with any certainty, making it difficult for lenders to predict how affordable a loan extending into retirement 
might be. The new pension freedoms have compounded the difficulties in assessing affordability on mortgage 
applications for older borrowers. The end of  compulsory annuitisation has introduced a new uncertainty around 
individual borrower behaviours, with consequences for their future income levels. Annuity sales have decreased 
since the end of  compulsory annuitisation (see Chapter One), and if  this trend continues, income in retirement 
is likely to be based on a much wider range of  sources than was the case under compulsory annuitisation. This 
presents new challenges for lenders in making affordability assessments, not least because investment income, 
savings, and asset-holding are not typically foregrounded within post-MMR affordability assessment criteria.
The FCA's post-MMR thematic review offers an opportunity to reflect on whether the current emphasis on 
repayment risk (and, in the case of  older borrowers, pension income) within the affordability criteria is preventing 
lenders from taking an holistic view to the affordability of  conventional mortgage lending into retirement.
2.3 Unsecured borrowing
We noted in Chapter One that unsecured borrowing is increasing amongst the over 50s. Older people are both 
carrying consumer debt into retirement and continuing to accrue unsecured debt during retirement. There is  
also evidence of  polarisation within the unsecured debtor population: Collard and Hayes (2014) found that credit 
use persists over time, with existing credit users, including those in their late 60s and early 70s, being more likely 
to become bigger borrowers than non-users were to become unsecured borrowers. They suggested that this 
could reflect escalating balances due to the effects of  compound interest and fees, particularly if  people fall behind 
with payments.
Research by Key Retirement Solutions found that the 65 and under age group had the highest levels of  credit 
card debt (average balance £9,650), typically making average monthly repayments of  £297. Whilst the 66-75 age 
group had, on average, lower amounts of  unsecured debt (£8,494), making payments averaging £584 a month, 
average credit card balances begin to increase, and monthly repayments dropped considerably (£225) amongst 
the over 75s8.
2.3.1 Limitations on access to unsecured borrowing in retirement
2.3.1.1 Age and income limits
Age is likely to present a barrier to many older people seeking to access good quality consumer credit services 
in retirement. Several ‘best-buy’ personal loan products carry age limits (Hitachi Capital impose an upper age 
limit of  60; Tesco and Clydesdale restrict their personal loans to people up to age 74; and across the sector, a 
maximum age limit of  79 is typical). While credit cards do not impose a maximum age criterion (since they are 
designed as short-term credit), many of  the lead providers have minimum income requirements, ranging from 
8 See KRS UK Equity Release Market Monitor, Q1 2015, available at https://www.keyretirement.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/Market-Monitor-Q1-20152.pdf  
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9 See https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/mlar-statistics-jun-2015-commentary.pdf
£3,000 but with an average of  about £15,000, which could exclude many older people. With average retirement 
incomes for people retiring in 2015 expected to be around £17,000 (Prudential, class of  2015), low-income is likely 
to be a significant barrier for many older people seeking to access good quality consumer credit.
2.4 Unregulated borrowing options
With a quarter of  the older population using unsecured credit and, of  those, ten per cent (around 400,000) paying 
over £85 a week to service their debt, there is a real risk of  older people being caught in a spiral of  debt, with 
options to repay or restructure debt increasingly limited. Since the financial crash has constrained access to credit, 
lack of  access to affordable credit with mainstream lenders has led many people on low-incomes to turn to other 
sources of  unregulated credit. Unregulated borrowing options include high-cost, short-term loans, and there is 
evidence that the market for high cost credit has expanded to meet the new demand stimulated by constraints in 
the regulated market (CSJ, 2013). The growth in financial exclusion from regulated credit is compounded, for older 
people, by age-restrictions on regulated mortgage lending and personal loans.
There is also evidence to suggest that mortgage market regulation may have created a lending bias which  
favours investors over residential home buyers, since the buy-to-let sector remains non-regulated and lenders  
are able to advance up to 85 per cent loan-to-value, interest-only, mortgages to landlords. Bank of  England  
and FCA mortgage lending statistics show that the proportion of  lending to first time buyers decreased by  
2.4 percentage points to 19.4 per cent in Q1 2015, while the value of  residential loans advanced to first time 
buyers also decreased over the past year by £0.5 billion to £8.9 billion. However, the buy-to-let proportion of  
lending increased from 14.9 per cent in Q4 2014 to 16.8 per cent in Q1 2015. There was also an increase in  
value terms over the past year – from £6.8 billion advanced in Q1 2014 to £7.6 billion in Q1 20159.
The lack of  restrictions on buy-to-let mortgages may tempt older people cashing in their pension pots into  
buy-to-let borrowing, prompting the ILC UK to warn against this relatively high-risk strategy. However, with 
research from pension advisers Portal Finance showing that, so far, only 9 per cent of  people had decided to take 
their pension as a lump sum and, of  those, only 5 per cent planned to invest in buy-to-let property, compared  
to 34 per cent who would use the money to pay off  an existing mortgage or other debts, it is not yet clear that 
buy-to-let has, or indeed will, become a significant retirement borrowing strategy.
2.5 Equity Release
Another option for borrowing in later life is equity release. Equity release products are a distinct category of  
home finance product offered exclusively to older consumers. Marketed as facilitative products which enable 
older owners to tap into housing equity without having to sell up and move out, or make repayments by 
instalment, they enable homeowners to trade on their housing asset to release capital or income while continuing 
to occupy the property as their home. The UK equity release market is primarily comprised of  two product 
types: lifetime mortgages and home reversion plans (both of  which operate a minimum age threshold) with 
lifetime mortgages now comprising the vast majority of  regulated sales (approximately 99 per cent). This has not 
always been the case, however, and a recent study of  equity release consumers offers some possible insights into 
the decline in the reversion market in recent years. While both products offer the ability to access some of  the 
value of  the home without having to move or make monthly repayments, lifetime mortgages differ considerably 
from home reversions in terms of  owners’ ability to retain legal ownership of  the property: in the case of  
reversions, this is transferred to the lender. This may be one of  the factors contributing to their limited popularity, 
particularly for those with lower levels of  income and wealth. In our 2013 study of  UK equity release consumers, 
concerns about feeling safe, secure and in control often played a significant part in determining the choice of  
product, particularly for less well off  participants, whereas the overriding consideration for better-off  owners 
centred on value for money (Fox O’Mahony & Overton, 2014b).
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For some lower socio-economic status consumers, concerns about accumulating debt meant that the certainty 
of  knowing the fixed share of  equity they would retain under a home reversion offered greater security than 
maintaining the arguably ‘fuller status’ of  owner under a lifetime mortgage. On the one hand, this reflects the 
likelihood that lower socio-economic status consumers live in lower value properties, and so are less likely to 
benefit from future house price rises; however, it also reveals a significant tension between tenure security and 
financial security. Lower socio-economic status owners who had opted for lifetime mortgages also tended to 
express the reasons for their preference in terms of  wishing to avoid loss of  control or insecurity. In explaining why 
they did not opt for a home reversion, one consumer said:
I didn’t like the thought of somebody owning it [the house] and being able to come round 
and inspect the property and say, ‘Well, you aren’t keeping it up’, or, ‘You’ve not done this’, or, 
‘You haven’t done that’. I didn’t like that at all . . . You feel as though you lose control of your 
house. If you like, you’re in actual fact giving up some of your feelings about the place. I’m 
sure you wouldn’t look upon your house in the same light if you’d given up the deeds as such. 
(Male, age 76, lower socio-economic status)
We also found that participants product choices were influenced by the advice process, where there appeared to 
be a bias towards lifetime mortgages. Point six of  the Equity Release Checklist for advisers asks:
(Prior to any recommendations) have you provided the customer with a fair and balanced 
overview of the pros and cons of both lifetime mortgages and reversion plans?
Comments made by participants in our consumer study included:
Well, they skated over it, [home reversion] let’s put it that way. (Female, age 81)
We didn’t consider that at the time. I don’t think we knew about it actually. (Male, age 80)
I think that [home reversion] was mentioned almost in a negative fashion I would say.  
(Male, age 77)
These findings raise questions about the extent to which the significant drop in reversion sales reflects the 
irrelevance of  such a product in today’s market; a (relative) lack of  innovation in this sector compared with 
the lifetime mortgage sector, or, whether it is (at least partially) attributable to adviser bias. This, in turn, raises 
another important question regarding the extent to which consumers are being advised on the product options 
that are best suited to their circumstances, needs and objectives. In a context which requires an additional 
qualification to advise on reversions, yet permits authorised advisers to legitimately promote themselves as 
independent while providing advice only in relation to one kind of  product (Sheldon et al, 2012), there is some 
potential for consumers to be misled and, ultimately, to purchase one product type (most likely a lifetime 
mortgage) when an alternative option may have been more appropriate. Regulatory rules state that advisers 
are required to disclose the scope of  the service they offer, but our research suggests that it is not clear that 
consumers are sufficiently aware of  this. In the absence of  a level playing field, or a clear obligation on advisers 
to consider whether, or not, a home reversion would be the more suitable product in every transaction, we may 
reasonably question the extent to which consumers are receiving advice that takes account of  the full range of  
options that may be available to them.
2.5.1 Uptake on equity release
With older people holding almost £1.4 trillion of  housing equity in their homes, equity release is viewed by many 
as a potential source of  finance for later life (House of  Lords, 2013). Recent trends in mainstream lending have 
also positioned retirement borrowing provision towards equity release by limiting the availability of  conventional 
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mortgage products for older people, especially older people with lower levels of  income and assets. While 
the equity release market remains small, at less than 2 per cent of  the mainstream mortgage market, there has 
been a significant recent increase in sales. Equity release lending to UK homeowners over the age of  55 totalled 
£384.3million in the second quarter of  2015: the largest amount for any quarter since records began10. Record 
lending in quarter 2 meant the total value of  equity released in the first six months of  2015 hit £710 million, with 
the total number of  new customers reaching just over 10,000 for the first half  of  2015.
Figure 2.2 Equity release total lending by quarter (£): 2012 – 2015
Source: Equity Release Council Data, received in personal communication.
The value of  lending, via lump sum lifetime mortgages, increased by 10 per cent year-on-year in the first half  
of  2015 to reach £285.3 million; this is the highest total for lump sum activity in the first half  of  any year since 
H1 2007, when the value hit £355.9 million. The value of  lending via drawdown lifetime mortgages showed the 
highest growth, rising 12 per cent year-on-year from £379.2m (H1 2014) to £423.5 million (H1 2015) and faster 
from Q1 to Q2 (21 per cent vs. 14 per cent for lump sum products).
Table 2.1 Growth of lending via lump sum and drawdown lifetime mortgages
Q2 2015 H1 2015
Quarterly growth Annual growth Annual growth
Lump Sum 36 6 916
Drawdown 41 10 2,333
Source: ERC Press Release, July 2015: ‘Equity Release Lending Surges to All-time High in Q2 Following Pension Freedoms’.
It is noteworthy that this uplift comes despite savers gaining greater access to their pension pots since the launch 
of  pension freedoms in April 2015. While the growth in drawdown may reflect the ongoing income needs 
discussed in Chapter One, the increase in lump sum sales could also be linked to debt clearance, including paying 
off  outstanding mortgage debt. Key Retirement Solutions have reported that 23 per cent of  their equity release 
customers in 2015 used equity release to repay mortgage debt, up from 17 per cent in 2010; and a marked 
increase in those utilising the funds in their home to repay unsecured debt, from 26 per cent for the first quarter 
of  2014 to 31 per cent for the same period of  2015. This may reflect the growing appeal of  using property wealth 
as a source of  retirement income as house prices began to rise. On the one hand, changes to pension regulation 
might have been expected to offer an alternative means of  obtaining lump sum funds; but, on the other, recent 
tax changes – which allow untapped pension savings to be passed on tax-free if  the pension-holder dies before 
the age of  75 – may incentivise earlier use of  housing equity and later use of  pension wealth.
This market growth follows a report published by the House of  Lords’ Select Committee on Public Service and 
Demographic Change which emphasised the importance of  ‘an effective equity release market to unlock the 
housing assets held by older people’ (House of  Lords, 2013). The Committee noted that equity release products 
are underused relative to potential, and suggested that this is linked to ‘quite considerable’ market failures:
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Wehaveheardthatolderpeoplelackconfidenceintheproductsthatareavailableandthat
as a result commercial products have poor take-up. This has knock-on effects for both the 
market in suitable housing for older people, and older people’s ability to adapt their homes 
for older age.
Possible strategies identified by the Committee included state support for social lending (building on the 
commitment to universal deferred payment schemes for care costs); and more communication about ‘the 
positive beneficial implications of  using equity in retirement planning’. Recognising the ‘urgent need for greater 
consumer confidence in the equity release industry’, the Committee proposed that ‘the Government should 
work with the financial services industry to encourage the growth of  a safe and easy-to-understand equity release 
market’, for example, by promoting reliable equity release products that offer ‘no negative equity guarantees’ and 
companies that have signed up to the Equity Release Council’s Code of  Conduct.
2.5.2 Supply side barriers to equity release market growth
While some of  the barriers identified by the House of  Lords (2013) report are being addressed, our research has 
indicated that, from an industry perspective, there remain some significant perceived barriers to wider up-take of  
equity release. In 2014, we conducted an in-depth analysis of  the views and experiences of  retirement borrowing 
stakeholders, including financial advisers, providers, consumer organisations, charities and law firms involved in 
equity release. We asked stakeholder participants about their views on the barriers to, and drivers for, market 
growth (Overton & Fox O’Mahony, 2015). Stakeholders identified a number of  supply side barriers to market 
growth, the most common of  which related to equity release products and equity release providers.
2.5.2.1 Products: Greater flexibility and innovation
Following the market downturn in the wake of  the Global Financial Crisis, the equity release industry set out to 
achieve market growth by introducing greater product flexibility. Flexible product features include drawdown 
lifetime mortgages allowing borrowers to obtain an agreed, maximum amount of  money as and when required; 
inheritance guarantees enabling consumers to protect a proportion of  their property value from the outset; and 
impaired life schemes (otherwise known as enhanced lifetime mortgages), which take into account the health and 
lifestyle of  the consumer, working on a similar principle to enhanced-rate annuities. One provider who re-entered 
the market in 2011 now offers lifetime mortgages which permit consumers to pay off  some of  the interest during 
the life of  the loan, thus reducing the overall cost of  the loan and increasing the amount left for inheritance at the 
end of  the loan term.
Despite these developments, many stakeholders suggested that current product offerings do not meet the 
changing needs and preferences of  successive generations of  retirees. Stakeholders expressed fairly widespread 
agreement on the need for greater product flexibility and innovation. Alternative product offerings were 
considered necessary not only to meet a wider range of  consumer needs, but also to ensure the long-term 
affordability of  equity release given demographic shifts such as increasing life expectancy and an increase in the 
average age of  first time buyers. One stakeholder suggested that:
Unless the products change so that interest can be paid in some way, shape or form, or part-
paid, part-rolled, or something like that, then I just don’t think that they’ll be affordable. All the 
interestrateswillbesohugethatitwouldn’tmakesense,itwouldn’tmakefinancialsense
because people would be in negative equity within a very few years…There’s a product that 
fitsmostneeds,Isuppose,butthereisn’tahugeamountofconsumerchoiceandIthinkthat
needs to change… (Private Sector, Adviser)
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Many stakeholders also suggested that, while Equity Release Council Standards and safeguards play an important 
role in consumer protection, these standards restrict product choice and flexibility. One requirement in the ERC 
code of  conduct is that customers have a No Negative Equity Guarantee, which means that they will never owe 
more than the value of  their homes and no debt will ever be left to the estate. Some stakeholders questioned the 
necessity of  this blanket approach to consumer protection, considering it to be one of  the factors contributing to 
limited demand:
The market will grow if better products come on the market… Millions of consumers would 
access this, if there was a simple, straightforward product that they could understand…The 
protectionsthattheEquityReleaseCouncilputforwardaregreat,butifthey’restiflingthe
market then that’s not great…As long as the risks are properly and clearly explained, some 
consumers may opt for a technically riskier product or forgo some of the protection in order 
togetamoreflexibleproduct.(Notforprofitsector)
They’re [Equity Release Council safeguards] nice to have, but the reality is I think they restrict 
innovation a little bit because we’re almost forcing every client to have it. So for example if 
you had a client with a £400,000 house and she’s borrowing £10,000 to replace the roof for 
example, does she really need a no negativity equity guarantee because you’d have to have 
something pretty extreme to happen for the £25,000 she may owe in 20 odd years’ time to 
erode the £400,000 value of her house. But because we have those protections built in as a 
norm, you’re forced to have it therefore you’re forced to carry a higher interest rate or higher 
set up charges to have each of those, so I think there needs to be a tiered approach to it so 
that different products that offer different levels of protection, you pay accordingly as to the 
levelofprotectionthatyouneedorthatyouchoosetohave…(Notforprofitsector)
A further consequence of  the ERC standards is that all ERC-compliant lifetime mortgages carry a fixed (or 
capped) interest rate for the life of  the loan. Originally, interest rates on lifetime mortgages were not fixed, and 
so in the adverse financial and economic conditions of  the late 1980s where interest rates rose and property 
values fell, some customers found that they were in negative equity (Appleton, 2003). The move to fixed or 
capped interest rates therefore reflected a concern, on the part of  the industry, to introduce greater consumer 
protection, but it may be that this particular product feature, which contrasts with the conventional mortgage 
market where there is limited demand for fixed interest rates in excess of  10 years, is also a potential barrier to 
greater product flexibility and increased customer demand.
The one-size-fits-all approach to consumer protection in the current equity release market has also been a source 
of  frustration for some equity release consumers. In another recent study (Fox O’Mahony & Overton, 2014b), 
some consumers expressed frustration over the FCA requirement that all non-professional/non-high-net-worth 
consumers receive (costly) independent financial advice. Although none of  these consumer participants questioned 
the desirability of  the NNEG, or indicated that they were dissatisfied with having to pay for the (indirect) costs that 
this incurs, it would be useful for further targeted research to explore more fully what consumers want from equity 
release products, and what they are prepared to pay for particular features and safeguards.
Any industry responses to consumer demand for greater product flexibility and innovation should, however, 
be tempered by the risk that a tiered approach to protective product features, without additional, alternative 
measures to ensure consumer protection, might have an adverse effect on consumer outcomes, since equity 
release consumers are not always in a position to take account of  the risks involved, even if  they are fully and 
clearly explained (Fox O’Mahony and Overton, 2014b).
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2.5.2.2 A negative image
‘Equity release’ is also sometimes perceived as continuing to suffer from the negative image it gained during the 
late 1980s and 1990s. During this time, certain products/providers employed investment strategies which, with 
increasing interest rates and poor stock market performance at the end of  the 1980s, left customers with large 
debts and negative equity; in some cases this led to repossession (Appleton, 2003). Although these practices no 
longer exist within the regulated equity release market, concerns about a poor industry reputation have lingered, 
prompting one stakeholder participant (Overton & Fox O’Mahony, 2015) to suggest that a name change might be 
the only way to shed the negative perception that many people still associate with equity release:
We sometimes can’t get clients beyond the fact that I don’t want to talk about equity 
release, I know I don’t want it. And if you ask them what is it you don’t want, they say, I don’t 
know but I know I don’t want it, I know it’s not safe…I think it’s just the label…we need to 
switch more towards retirement lending, retirement mortgages as the badge of what we 
do…(Notforprofitsector)
This negative image is particularly salient in light of  the impact of  negative perceptions of  equity release in creating 
an atmosphere of  stigma and secrecy relating to retirement borrowing. Although the next generation of  retirees 
may have a different set of  attitudes to borrowing, debt and outright ownership in later life, recent research 
suggests that, for the current cohort of  older owners, reluctance to talk about borrowing money in retirement 
remains a potentially significant barrier (Fox O’Mahony & Overton, 2014a).
In our 2013 equity release consumer study, we asked all participants if  they knew anyone else with an equity 
release plan. The overwhelming majority reported that they did not. Reflecting on the possible reasons for this, 
participants repeatedly pointed towards the silence that surrounds equity release. Some explained this by noting 
that older people belong to a generation where money matters are not openly discussed; other participants 
also acknowledged that to ‘admit’ to having taken out an equity release plan might represent failure for some 
people – failure to achieve economic success and the perceived ‘norm’ of  debt-free old age as an outright owner. 
Our findings revealed a distinction between ‘respectable’ acquisition mortgage debt, on the one hand, and more 
socially-unacceptable equity release debt on the other (Fox O’Mahony & Overton, 2014a).
I don’t actually let on I’ve taken it out, I think that’s like saying you’ve got another mortgage 
again. There is no end to this sort of mortgage unless I pay it all back . . . then I would be in 
dire straits…I didn’t have a mortgage when I took out equity release. So I suppose in some 
ways I feel a bit ashamed because I’ve got another one again when I’m getting on in life. My 
aim was always not to have a mortgage when I retired. (Female, age 74)
Almost everybody has a mortgage, regardless of your age bracket. And there’s great rejoicing 
when older people clear off their mortgage…And so because it’s so general, mortgages are 
acceptable conversation. But somehow, with equity release, it’s, ‘Oh, you poor thing. You know, 
you had to do this because you can’t manage, you’re so poor’. And so there’s a very slight 
stigma about it, unless you can make it abundantly clear it’s purely because you intended 
going on a world cruise, then that’s acceptable. But to actually go in for it because you won’t 
otherwise be able to manage, that’s rather looked down upon. (Female, age 81)
The silence and stigma that surrounds equity release has a number of  important implications. Firstly, it has 
implications for ‘peer-to-peer learning’ as a route to increased financial capability for older people with 
respect to equity release transactions. This is particularly acute for those who are less experienced in financial 
transactions more generally, and for those who are less well off. The likelihood that older people will only have 
one opportunity to select an equity release product to cash-in their housing equity also means that there is little 
opportunity for individuals to learn from their own experiences. A culture of  silence and stigma is also likely to 
inhibit the wider take-up of  equity release, with adverse implications for some older owners for whom it might 
present an appropriate financial solution.
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2.5.2.3 Lenders
Half  of  our stakeholder interviewees also considered the limited number of  equity release providers to be 
one of  the key barriers to market growth. Among these participants, the perceived benefits of  a ‘big player’ or 
household name entering the market included greater consumer choice; greater competition among existing 
providers (with the effect of  greater product innovation and more competitive pricing for consumers); and 
greater trust and respectability for equity release (Overton & Fox O’Mahony, 2015).
I can see a big player coming in…if it gains that new found respectability then that to me 
would be the biggest trigger for equity release growth going ahead. Because then it would 
become High Street, it would have a brand and it would be something that the consumer 
can relate to, probably has some foundation of trust in, and makes them think, hey, this is 
quite respectable actually. (Private Sector Adviser)
Since we carried out these interviews, Legal and General – a well-known company that consumers are familiar 
with in relation to other financial services – have entered the equity release market and have stated that they 
expect to write over £100 million of  business in 2015. It remains to be seen whether their presence will make a 
significant difference to equity release sales, as some stakeholders in the study predicted.
2.5.3 Demand side barriers to equity release growth
While the recent increase in equity release sales suggests that there is growing interest in these products, as a 
form of  retirement borrowing or equity withdrawal it remains relatively unpopular. As the table below shows, just 
4 per cent of  homeowners in 2009 would have considered borrowing against the value of  their homes or selling 
a share of  their property to an equity release company to provide income while the most popular option was 
moving to a smaller home or to a less expensive home or area (59 per cent).
Table 2.2 Views on using housing equity to help fund retirement, 2006 and 2009
Options for using housing to help fund retirement
2006
All  
%
2009
All 
%
2009
Home owners only 
%
Not a home owner 33 35
Home owners who wouldn’t consider any of  these 
options (base=all)
23 21 32
Any of the following (multiple answers permitted)  
of which:
44 44
Moving to a smaller or less expensive home or area 38 39 59
Selling your home and renting 4 7 4
Borrowing against the value of  your home 5 4 2
Selling a share of  your home to an equity release 
company to provide income
5 4 2
Base 1,950 1,654 1,072+
Source: Clery et al (2009) p.72.
This relatively low level of  interest in equity release products tends to be associated with concerns relating to 
security and value for money (Rowlingson, 2006; Ong et al, 2013). Croucher (2008) found that many people 
were highly suspicious of  equity release products, and that they associated them with other ‘scams’ such as 
endowment mortgages and problems with pension funds that had failed to deliver the returns that people were 
expecting. Jones et al (2010) also found that older people tended to be suspicious of  equity release products and 
financial services in general.
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The Attitudes to Pensions Survey (2009) suggests that public perceptions of  the extent to which these products 
offer good value for money have become more negative over time (see Figure 2.3), although it is possible that the 
increase in negative attitudes towards equity release products reflects an increase in negativity towards the housing 
market in general.
Figure 2.3 Agreement with view that equity release schemes provide poor value for money, 2006 and 2009
Source: Clery et al (2009) p.74.
The most recent Attitudes to Pensions Survey (2012) did not collect equity release data, so we cannot track 
changes in attitudes since 2009, but it is conceivable that, as the housing market begins to recover, it would be 
economically rational for attitudes to equity release to shift in a more positive direction. Against this, however, 
negative (and sometimes misleading) media portrayal of  equity release products is likely to continue to dampen 
demand for these products; compromising their potential to provide a valuable solution to bridging some of  the 
shortfall between income and needs/preferences in later life. Research often shows that while there is a high level 
of  awareness of  these products among older people, negative attitudes towards them remain stubbornly hard 
to change. Just Retirement (2012), for example, found that attitudes to equity release were largely unfavourable. 
While most people had heard of  equity release, there was a considerable lack of  understanding about how 
the products work. For the industry, the challenges range from product innovation – with a view to meeting 
consumers’ needs through terms and conditions and product features as well as addressing concerns about value 
for money – to advertising and promotion to address the continued reluctance of  most older owners to use 
equity release as a vehicle for retirement borrowing.
2.6 Other barriers to accessing retirement borrowing options
This chapter has highlighted the particular impacts of  the ‘credit crunch’ that was triggered by the global 
financial crisis from 2007 for the UK’s retirement borrowing market. Reduced lending and stricter criteria have 
reduced the opportunities for older people to avail of  mainstream borrowing options. While the industry and 
the regulator are agreed that this is not an outcome that they welcome, the sector has not yet overcome the 
barriers (including regulatory restraint and concern about conduct risk) to re-invigorating a post-GFC retirement 
borrowing market that can effectively and appropriately cater to the needs, preferences and circumstances of  a 
highly diverse later life consumer population.
In addition to the product-specific barriers and opportunities for market growth outlined above, the development 
of  an effective and appropriate market for retirement borrowing must also be sensitive to contextual factors that 
are likely to affect how consumers access financial services in later life. ‘Older owners’ are a widely differentiated 
population, with widely varying levels of  health, wealth, income and assets, and financial and legal capabilities, and 
– in terms of  age – spanning several decades from the ‘over 50s’ to a growing cohort of  centenarians. Across this 
sizeable and diverse consumer population, there are some important questions to bear in mind when considering 
the opportunities and limitations of  the retirement borrowing market.
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2.6.1 Financial capability and vulnerability
The complex nature of  the terms and contractual details of  many financial products mean that even consumers 
with good levels of  literacy and numeracy struggle to understand them. The FSA’s 2006 baseline survey found 
that the over-70s were much weaker than the general population at choosing financial products (FSA, 2006: 8); 
although this survey also noted that the over-60s were particularly strong at ‘making ends meet’ (10), another 
measure of  overall ‘financial capability’ which perhaps informed the FSA’s decision not to focus on older people as 
a ‘vulnerable group’ for follow-up work.
The Wealth and Assets Survey measures financial capability against 6 dimensions: making ends meet, planning 
ahead, organised money management, controlled spending, staying informed, and choosing products. ‘Planning 
ahead’ is based on the extent to which someone makes provision for future expenditure from current income’ 
while ‘choosing financial products’ refers to the sources of  information (if  any) someone uses when buying a 
financial product that most influence their purchase decision, and which deems a consumer to be ‘highly capable’ 
where he/she has bought a financial product within the last 2 years after shopping around, consulting best buy 
information or using a comparison website (Finney and Hayes, 2015). The impact of  reliance on online consumer 
information as an element in consumer capability to choose financial products is also significant in light of  digital 
exclusion amongst older people. According to Ofcom, in q1 2014 significant proportions of  older people did not 
have access to the internet at home: 33 per cent of  the 65-74 age group and 68 per cent of  the 75+ age group 
(cited by Age UK, 2015). Given that many forms of  communication concerning financial products and services 
is delivered online (with many of  the best deal options only available online), digital exclusion is likely to reduce 
financial capability, as well as directly resulting in older people’s exclusion from products and services that they 
could benefit from.
All six measures in the Wealth and Assets Survey are scored on a scale of  0 to 10, and – echoing the FSA baseline 
survey’s findings, the 2010/12 wave found that ‘planning ahead’ was a particularly weak area across the general 
population, generating a mean capability score of  just 2.3. ‘Choosing products’ ranked fairly highly across the general 
population with a mean score of  6.6, but, again, older people scored poorly in terms of  this measure (Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4 Mean Financial Capability Scores by Age: Great Britain 2010 to 2012
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey 2010-12 – Office for National Statistics. 
Base: All adults interviewed in person (n=32,092), except for choosing products (n=16,379). 
Notes: Means are rounded to one decimal place.
Given the increasing necessity for older people to navigate complex choices and decisions about retirement 
income and assets, especially in the new pension liberalisation climate, persistent evidence of  low financial 
capability in choosing products is particularly concerning, compounded by the ‘impact vulnerability’ of  older 
consumers who have less opportunity than younger people to recover from financial loss resulting from sub-
optimal product choice.
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2.6.2 Advice and guidance
Lower capability in choosing products amongst older populations has implications for how the sector supports 
their financial decision-making. This includes provision of  clear, simple and straightforward information, and 
access to good quality independent financial advice; while recognising that consumers with lower levels of  
financial capability, who may be most in need of  financial advice, are least likely to be able to afford it (Ring, 2003; 
Thoreson, 2007; 2008). Furthermore, our equity release consumer study (Fox O’Mahony & Overton, 2014b) 
found that, while financial advice was viewed as worthwhile and helpful by many consumers, it was most useful for 
those (predominately better-off ) consumers who were ‘prepared’ or ‘ready’ to receive advice, who had already 
researched the options and who knew what questions to ask. We also found that equity release decisions were 
informed by a range of  psychological biases and contextual factors including personal and financial circumstances, 
embeddedness within particular communities and networks and the nature of  the relationship between consumer 
and financial advisers. This implies that the reliance on information and advice within the current FCA regime for 
equity release is of  limited and unequal value in delivering consumer protection: calibrated to the needs of  less-
vulnerable consumers (those who are able to research, plan, and know what questions to ask, either because they 
are financially capable themselves and/or have friends or family who can help them to prepare), it is least effective 
in protecting the most vulnerable consumers.
The challenge of  mediating different needs within a highly diverse consumer population has been a key priority of  
the newly-constituted FCA, following the emphasis on ‘differentiated consumers’ in the Mortgage Market Review 
and under the Financial Services Act 2012, section 6(1)(1C)(2). Yet, the MMR’s emphasis on financial advice as the 
vehicle through which to protect equity release consumers – and, particularly, the suggestion that more vulnerable 
consumers are likely to benefit most from advice (FSA, 2011 (MMR): 5.78) – was not supported by our equity 
release consumer study findings. More recently, the FCA’s (2015b) Occasional Paper on consumer vulnerability 
has signalled recognition of  a broader conception of  vulnerability, taking into account the interplay of  individual 
circumstances, situations and the part played by market or firm behaviour. Within this, there is a focus on the 
need to improve inflexible products designed for the standardised perfect consumer, with the FCA noting that ‘a 
frequent consumer complaint related to products taken out in good faith before the onset of  vulnerability – which 
at a later date turned out to be unsuitable in some way for the situation they found themselves in. Consumers 
often feel that the details of  exclusions and exceptions are not properly explained’. This resonates with the 
situation that some older people have found themselves in when requesting flexible arrangements to support the 
effective management of  outstanding mortgage debt (see p.17, section 2.2.2.1).
The FCA has stated that it will soon publish a discussion paper to explore how the FCA and the industry can 
work together to deliver information to consumers about the products or services they have bought or are 
thinking of  buying in smarter and more effective ways.
2.6.3 Uneven distribution of housing wealth
Another important factor differentiating older consumers is that, notwithstanding significant regional variation in 
housing wealth, housing wealth tends to be positively correlated with other wealth (i.e. pension wealth). This has 
important implications for the distribution of  housing wealth in relation to need as well as for the future growth 
of  the retirement borrowing market: if  housing wealth is distributed unevenly, benefitting a smaller proportion of  
the UK population – and there are fewer home owners overall – this will reduce demand for secured borrowing 
products into the future.
We noted in chapter one that housing wealth is largely concentrated in the hands of  older people; although  
this aggregate pattern masks significant differentiation and wealth inequality across and within generations.  
While older generations, particularly the baby boomer generations, have accumulated considerable housing 
wealth, and certainly larger amounts than younger cohorts, there is substantial inequality within older age groups. 
One source of  differentiation is location-and house-price-dependent variation in prospects for house value gains 
(See Figure 2.5).
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11 Problem Debt Among Older People – Age UKs summary of  research by the International Longevity Centre UK: http://www.ageuk.org.uk/Documents/EN-
GB/For-professionals/Policy/ageuk_ilc_debt_report_summary_040613.pdf?dtrk=true
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Figure 2.5 Mean home equity by region and age group
Source: National Housing Federation (2014), p.10, based on wealth and assets survey 2010-12, available at http://www.housinglin.org.uk/Topics/browse/
Housing/Commissioning/?&msg=0&parent=3693&child=9541
Significant regional variation in house prices is reflected in sales of  equity release products, where the South East 
saw the highest number and value of  plans sold in 2015, accounting for 23 per cent of  all UK equity release plans 
and 28 per cent of  total lending. Total lending in the region increased by 35 per cent during the first half  of  the 
year compared to the same period of  2014, whilst plan numbers grew by 20 per cent. The average property 
value for those releasing equity in the South-East region was £329,624, outweighed only by London. These 
regional differences in house price growth are a significant factor in shaping the equity release landscape, as well as 
a source of  exclusion for those who have not benefitted from a house price windfall, and who are – with limited 
housing wealth likely to correlate with lower pensions and savings – likely to have fewer options in the retirement 
borrowing market.
2.6.4 Debt aversion and ‘going without’
Finally, it is important to remember that older people still have more negative attitudes towards using credit, and 
are less likely to have debts than younger age groups. Age UK’s 2014 evaluation of  problem debt among older 
people found that increasing age is still associated with more negative attitudes towards debt; with women having 
more negative views about debt than men. Married or cohabiting people were also more negative about debt 
than those who were single; and older people from ethnic minorities, those who had lower incomes and people 
living in rented housing were particularly unlikely to resort to credit. It is not currently known whether the impact 
of  reluctance to use financial services leads to other forms of  debts, or to some older people living without 
essential services or items11.
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CHAPTER 1 3
Sharing Risk and Responsibility for 
Lending in Retirement
3.1 A joined-up approach
The House of  Lords Ready for Ageing report indicated that, while the Government cannot carry all the risks and 
costs of  an ageing population, there is much the Government can do to help people prepare for meeting their own 
financial needs in retirement, including by: ‘…mak[ing] it easier to harness the value in people’s homes to support 
some of  the costs and risks of  later years…’ (p.38). As responsibility for financial security has been shifted from 
the state to the individual, there is an increasingly important role for personal assets, including housing, in later life 
provision. In this chapter, we reflect on the potential role of  the state in creating a suitable environment for the 
operation of  a financial services market that enables older people to better manage their resources in retirement.
The effective implementation of  policies geared towards housing equity decumulation as a source of  retirement 
finance depends on the availability, suitability and attractiveness of  products, with the financial services industry 
expected to play a key role here. In pension provision, and particularly following the end of  compulsory 
annuitisation, the industry is facing the significant challenge to develop new products and services that will meet 
the retirement income needs of  individuals throughout retirement. Similarly, with respect to finance for long-term 
care, the Care Act 2014 has sought to create a framework which stimulates consumer demand, as the backdrop 
for a new environment in which financial services companies can develop new care products. And in its ‘Ready 
for Ageing’ report, the House of  Lords’ Select Committee on Public Service and Demographic Change specifically 
emphasised the importance of  ‘an effective equity release market to unlock the housing assets held by older 
people’ (Ready for Ageing, 2013), and proposed that ‘the Government should work with the financial services 
industry to encourage the growth of  a safe and easy-to-understand equity release market’ (see Chapter 2).
While the Government has clearly articulated its expectation that the financial services industry will play a central 
role in facilitating retirement finance, questions remain about the extent to which the industry is fully equipped 
to deliver what is expected of  it, and the role that the state should, or could, play, in better enabling both the 
industry and consumers to meet retirement needs more effectively. There are a range of  examples to illustrate 
the problems that flow from a gap between policy-making and implementation, whereby policy parameters 
are set without sufficient consideration for deliverability, including whether appropriate vehicles for delivery 
exist, and the extent to which the agents of  delivery (for example, financial services providers, advisers and 
regulators) are equipped to deliver new policy expectations. In Chapter 2, we highlighted some of  the unintended 
consequences resulting from post-GFC mortgage market regulation, which has left some older people unable 
to access borrowing that they could afford, with adverse and unnecessary exclusion implications for consumers, 
and prudential risks for lenders. Similarly, in the case of  care funding, the government has called on the industry 
to respond to the new policy environment by developing appropriate products, but without working through the 
necessary detail of  implementation, taking account of  the broader context in which they must operate.
The industry has signalled its willingness to innovate in order to bring new products to market, while calling on the 
government to support them, for example, by raising public awareness and providing information and advice on 
the likely need and costs of  care. Consumer engagement is crucial to the success of  these policies, to generate 
demand for the types of  products that could enable the delivery of  policy outcomes; yet, the financial services 
industry has expressed concern that a lack of  public understanding and awareness, for example, regarding the 
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new landscape for care funding, could disincentivise consumers from making provision for future care needs, so 
inhibiting demand for appropriate financial products and stifling industry innovation. Indeed, a lack of  existing and 
past demand has meant that the market for pre-funded long term care plans has disappeared, with no currently 
active providers in this market, or in the market for long term care bonds (SOLLA Handbook). The long term 
care market is currently focused on immediate needs annuities from three main providers, but these products are 
designed to pay for care costs at the point of  need, rather than planning ahead for the possibility of  needing care.
In order to be able to bring new products to market, the financial services industry has called for action from the 
government to enhance public awareness and support the provision of  information and advice12. A YouGov Poll 
carried out in December 2013 (on behalf  of  Just Retirement) found that nearly one third of  those aged 55 and 
over believe that councils pay most of  the cost while around 40 per cent believe that individuals pay most of  the 
costs (with councils topping up the rest). Evidence also suggests that people significantly underestimate the scale 
of  residential care costs; in stark contrast to the actual average cost of  a residential home being £29,016 per year 
rising to £38,376 for a nursing home (ILC UK, 2014).
In the pension sector we have seen how the transfer of  pension risk to consumers has left many people struggling 
to navigate the highly complex risks involved in pension planning. Paul Johnson, Director of  the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies (IFS) has noted that: “We have moved from a world where the state, which is pretty good at bearing 
these kinds of  risks...was bearing most of  the risk, through a period when employers were bearing most of  the 
risk, to a situation for the current working generation where individuals are bearing most of  the risk, and they 
are probably least well set up for bearing that risk” (cited in House of  Lords, 2013). In the pension context, 
the decline in state responsibility was initially balanced against final salary employer pensions which carried the 
longevity and investment risks of  guaranteeing fixed pension outcomes. However, the difficulties for employers 
to bear these risks eventually overwhelmed firms’ capacity or willingness to provide such pensions, triggering a 
seismic shift to defined contribution pensions, with less predictable outcomes for consumers.
This has compounded financial uncertainty for consumers, adding to the already difficult task of  planning ahead.  
In 2012, the Institute for Fiscal Studies reported that a third of  those approaching retirement were unable to 
estimate how much income they will receive from their private pension; 40 per cent approaching retirement 
have given no thought to how to finance retirement; and 70 per cent of  those purchasing annuities on retirement 
from non-employer direct contribution (DC) funds do not shop around for the best rates (Crawford and Tetlow, 
2012). This contributes to market failures, when consumers are unable to effectively navigate the choices held 
out by the market. This, in turn, undermines the goals of  policy-makers, which rely on active participation from 
consumers in practices of  saving and managing their own resources to meet their retirement needs. 
Planning for older age now requires the careful negotiation of  a range of  risks and uncertainties, from personal 
life events over which consumers have limited control (including health and disability risks, longevity risks), to 
the market risks associated with financial transactions, especially in respect of  complex, non-discrete products 
(investment risk, inflation). The pensions example illustrates some of  the barriers to strategies that place risks 
solely, or largely, on the financial services industry or on consumers that cannot effectively be managed. It 
highlights the importance of  understanding the distribution of  risk across the state, the industry, and consumers, 
taking account of  the nature and extent of  the risks that each can realistically bear, to create an environment in 
which the effective delivery of  policy initiatives becomes feasible. Research exploring the long-term experiences 
of  equity release consumers has also highlighted the difficulties people have in planning ahead and anticipating 
their changing needs and circumstances, highlighting the importance of  forward looking advice to support people 
in meeting their long-term needs (Fox O’Mahony & Overton, 2014a).
Drawing on examples from overseas and, in light of  the analysis set out in Chapter Two, the next section 
considers how other jurisdictions have approached the question of  risk-sharing between the state and the market 
for meeting people’s retirement borrowing needs in the context of  housing wealth decumulation.
12 Just Retirement, Care Act 2014 – Overview, Technical Bulletin.
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3.2 Sharing risk and responsibility in equity release: International comparisons
The continued debate over income security in later life and, particularly, the potential role of  housing 
wealth in underpinning retirement borrowing is an important policy issue in many other advanced 
homeownership regimes, including the US, Australia, and South Korea, where the state plays a range of  
roles in supporting individuals and financial services industries in managing the changing financial landscape 
of  retirement.
In some countries, Governments have provided greater support for equity release products that better 
enable individuals and the financial services industry to manage the risks and costs of  equity borrowing. 
For example, as we noted in Chapter Two, one factor that is perceived to inhibit equity release market 
growth from a consumer perspective is concern over pricing and value for money. Yet, a 2006 study for 
the Financial Services Consumer Panel of  lifetime mortgage products then available in the UK concluded 
that – taking account of  the risks to providers, particularly the potential costs of  the ‘no negative equity 
guarantee’ – across the market as a whole products were priced on a fair basis13. Indeed, there will 
always be constraints on what is commercially viable given the risks that providers face. For lifetime 
mortgages, these include: (1) termination risk: that is, how long the lender will have to wait to recover 
the capital through sale of  the property (which depends on factors including longevity and future health 
of  the borrower), and, the risk that by the time this happens, the value of  the property will be insufficient 
to discharge the debt, interest and costs (presuming that the lender has given a ‘no negative equity 
guarantee’); (2) interest rate risk, including the uncertainties of  variable interest rates for insurers, since 
higher-rates may increase the likelihood of  non-repayment on termination; and (3) future house-price risk.
While the FSCP’s report suggested that – taking account of  the risks to lenders – lifetime mortgages 
were, generally speaking, fairly priced, consumers’ perceptions that these products offer poor value for 
money remains a barrier to market growth. As we noted in Chapter Two, one way of  approaching this 
gap between what consumers expect and what the industry can provide would be to conduct further 
research exploring the importance of  features that drive up the price (for example, the no negative equity 
guarantee), to evaluate the relative importance of  mandatory terms and conditions and build consumer 
awareness of  how pricing is determined, based on the distribution of  risk between lenders and borrowers. 
Another way of  approaching this question is to consider alternative frameworks for managing the risks 
for providers. For example, in some countries, the state has played a stronger role in supporting the 
development of  the equity release offer, so contributing to market growth.
In the US, lifetime mortgages sold under the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) programme 
are insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which protects lenders against the risk that 
the loan balance may eventually exceed the value of  the property. In order to qualify for the HECM, 
borrowers must be at least 62 years of  age, they must own their property outright or have only a small 
mortgage left to pay on it and the property must meet FHA property standards (HUD, 2011). As with 
the UK’s lifetime mortgages, no repayments are required on HECMs during the borrower’s lifetime and/
or for as long as the property remains their principal residence. Lenders recover their capital plus interest 
when the property is eventually sold (HUD, 2011). However, in contrast to the lifetime mortgages 
International Case Studies
13 Financial Services Consumer Panel, Report on the value of  equity release products to UK consumers, Prepared by Watson Wyatt Ltd (November 2006); available 
online at http://www.fs-cp.org.uk/publications/pdf/report_value_equity.pdf
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offered by lenders in the UK, the US government (the FHA) will pay the lender the necessary amount 
to cover the shortfall if  the sale proceeds are not sufficient to cover the amount that is owed. The FHA 
collects a Mortgage Insurance Premium (MIP) from all borrowers in order to provide this coverage. The 
insurance premium also guarantees that if  the lender goes out of  business, the government will ensure 
that borrowers still have access to their loan funds (Huan and Mahoney, 2002; National Reverse Mortgage 
Lenders Association, 2011).
The HECM programme has been available since 1989 and is the most popular reverse mortgage (or 
lifetime mortgage) in the US accounting for approximately 95 per cent of  the total market (National 
Reverse Mortgage Lenders Association (NRMLA), 2011). Government-backed insurance has almost 
certainly helped to encourage a large number of  US lenders to enter the reverse mortgage market, which 
has in turn increased competition and driven down interest rates.
A similar programme was developed in South Korea, which introduced the Jootaekyeonkeum ( JTYK) 
reverse mortgage under the Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC) Act in 2007. The KHFC’s 
rationale for introducing JTYK was to enable older people to use their own resources to meet both their 
housing and their financial needs, thus enabling the government to provide a social safety net at minimal 
public cost (KHFC, 2008). Owners can take a monthly income, which they can opt (under changes 
introduced in 2008) to increase or decrease by a maximum of  3 per cent per annum. Alternatively, they 
can take lump-sum payments with some restrictions on how this can be spent (including bans on gambling, 
speculative investments and extravagant consumption).
Following the US example, the scheme is supported by government guarantees which effectively reduce 
risk to the mortgage provider, thereby increasing the return for older owners. Borrowers also benefit from 
a number of  tax concessions: they are exempt from registration, education and special rural taxes; they 
receive a 25 per cent reduction in property taxes, subject to income and wealth limits; and a reduction in 
income tax liability. When it was introduced, JTYK was limited to people who were at least 65 years-old, 
living in their own (and only) home, valued to a maximum of  600 million won. A year later, the age limit 
was lowered to 60 years and the maximum value increased to 900 Million won. In 2008, the first full year 
of  the scheme, 695 applications for reverse mortgages were approved, and although the numbers remain 
small they increased rapidly to 2,016 in 2010 and 2,081 in the first 9 months of  2011 (KHFC, 2011).
The state-backed guarantees offered in the US and South Korean markets enable lenders to offer lower 
interest rates and relatively large payments compared with the non-state-backed products offered in the 
UK and Australia (see Table 5).
Table 3.1 International Comparison of lifetime mortgages
Product Government-
insured?
Approximate 
Maximum loan  
(% of house value)*
Interest rate type
U.S HECM Yes 58% Fixed; Variable
South Korea JTYK Yes 60% Fixed; Variable
UK Lifetime Mortgage No 41% Fixed only
Australia Lifetime Mortgage No 22% Fixed; variable
*For a borrower age 72. Notes: These figures are approximate based on a standard, lump sum, lifetime mortgage. Source: Munnell and Sass (2014); 
Ma and Deng (2013); Deloitte (2013); Just Retirement14.
14 Lump Sum Plus Lifetime Mortgage http://www.justadviser.com/Documents/15949%202%20JR%20Lump%20Sum%20Lifetime%20Mortgage%206541%20v7.pdf
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Although the global financial crisis threatened the long-term sustainability of  the HECM programme, 
the US Federal Government signalled its continued commitment to support this sector, through the 
Reverse Mortgage Stabilisation Act 2013, which intervened to prevent its collapse. The changes brought 
by the 2013 Act have lowered the total amount that older owners can borrow, but loan-to-value ratios 
nevertheless remain considerably higher than the UK equivalent (see Table 6).
Table 3.2 New HECM Programme and the HECM Standard and Saver Programmes it replaced
Programme Maximum loan*  
(% of house value)
Insurance premiums
Up-front 
(% of house value)
Ongoing 
(% of loan balance)
New Programme 57.5 0.50 1.25
Programmes replaced:
HECM Standard 67.7 2.00 1.25
HECM Saver 55.4 0.01 1.25
*Maximum loan for a borrower age 72 on a 5 per cent interest rate loan. Source: Munnell and Sass (2014), p.3.
In a number of  other ways, East Asian countries such as Japan and Singapore have sought to strengthen 
the contribution of  home ownership to meeting older people’s income needs (Doling and Ronald, 2012). 
In Japan, for instance, recognition of  considerable reluctance among older people to trade down led to 
the establishment of  the ‘house moving support scheme for the elderly’ in 2006. Under this scheme, a 
government agency rents houses from home owners over 50 years old. The properties are then sub-let 
to younger family households with children. With contracts lasting their lifetime, the older households 
receive a rental income which can be put towards re-housing in smaller dwellings. In order to support 
the smooth running of  the leasing system, and to offset risks of  non-repayment and vacant properties, 
the government provides a contingency guarantee (Doling and Ronald, 2012, p.482). Such schemes, if  
developed elsewhere, could potentially address the twin challenges of  deficient pension incomes and 
insufficient housing new build.
In Singapore, the Housing and Development Board (HDB) has built and sold apartments to eligible 
Singaporeans such that they are now owned by around 80 per cent of  the population. This programme 
has been underpinned by an assumption that owning a home reduces living costs in retirement, thereby 
allowing older people to get by on smaller pensions. In March 2009, the HBD launched its Lease Buyback 
Scheme (LBS) enabling owners of  homes with three or less rooms to sell some of  the remaining years 
of  their lease to the HBD in return for a lifelong supplement to their income. Minimum age restrictions 
apply (youngest lessee at least 62 years) as well as a number of  others such as a household income of  S 
$3,000 or less and no equity having already been released via downsizing. Under the scheme, the HDB 
buys back any remaining years of  a lease in excess of  30 years at market value. The HDB provides a 
subsidy of  S $10,000, together funding a S $5,000 lump sum with the remainder being used to purchase an 
annuity from the Singaporean Central Provident Fund Board. The scheme therefore allows for a lifetime 
supplement to income while also allowing older people to continue living in their homes. If  they die before 
the end of  the 30 year lease then the proceeds of  the sale of  the remaining years of  the lease are passed 
on to their estate. If  they are still living after 30 years; the HDB will make alternative arrangements such as 
sourcing a place in a nursing home (Doling and Ronald, 2012, p. 483).
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In addition to underwriting risk and enabling and encouraging housing equity decumulation via other means, 
such as the house moving schemes available in some East Asian countries, another way for governments 
to support housing wealth decumulation is via tax laws. Released equity in income form may be subject to 
income tax, as in the UK, and this has played a part in stifling the development and innovation of  income-
based equity release products or equity loan schemes. In response to this barrier, one leading provider of  
equity release products, Just Retirement, developed the drawdown lifetime mortgage. Lifetime mortgages 
taken out with a drawdown facility allow the borrower to obtain an agreed, maximum amount of  money, 
as and when required. This facility can reduce the effect of  compound interest by allowing customers to 
take out smaller amounts of  money at different periods rather than accessing a single, larger lump sum. 
Though this has proven a popular development, and drawdown lifetime mortgages now account for a 
greater proportion of  sales than the more traditional lump sum lifetime mortgage (see Chapter 2), it is 
still a compromise, and the market does not currently meet the needs of  those who might want or need 
a scheme producing a regular income. If  housing equity released as an income stream benefitted from the 
same tax exemptions as mortgage payments and payments into private pension schemes, the industry 
may be more inclined to fill this gap. In some other European countries, such as Poland, released equity in 
income form is not subject to income tax (depending on Product type)15.
These tax-based restrictions may reduce the potential for housing equity to play a role in meeting everyday 
living expenses for house rich, income poor households, and for the market to reach a wider consumer 
population. Similarly, for those in receipt of  means-tested benefits, opportunities for drawing on the value 
of  the home to bridge the gap between income and needs in later life are limited. This has traditionally 
been seen as a potentially significant barrier to wider take up of  equity release in the UK, since those in 
receipt of  means tested benefits may lose substantial amounts of  entitlement by entering into a plan (Terry 
and Gibson, 2006). It is possible to retain entitlement during an Assessed Income Period (AIP), but if  and 
when the AIP comes to an end, an individual’s entitlement will be reassessed and the income or capital 
from an equity release plan will be taken into account.
Third and private sector partnerships have gone some way to overcoming this barrier by offering products 
that are more suited to the needs of  poorer groups. The Home Cash Plan, for example, was developed in 
collaboration with the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and Just Retirement. The product allows small sums  
to be released on demand at least once a year, a wide range of  properties can be offered as security for  
a loan, and the set–up fees are lower than on most other lifetime mortgages (Terry and Gibson, 2010, p.5). 
Additionally, and, unlike most commercial products, the minimum initial draw-down is sufficiently small that 
it will not increase the home owners’ savings beyond the threshold for Pension Credit. The scheme was 
initially piloted in three local authorities, and while a welcome development, early evaluations indicated 
low take up noting ‘that it is difficult to bring equity release to the attention of  older home-owners on 
low incomes in a way that encourages them to consider it, even though it may be a very useful option for 
them’ (Terry and Gibson, 2012, p. 7). These challenges raise questions, once again, about the need for a 
more joined-up, holistic approach to borrowing in retirement.
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In summary, this chapter has drawn attention to a number of  overseas programmes and practices in housing 
wealth decumulation to provide a useful illustration of  the potential role that the state can play in supporting the 
retirement borrowing sector through greater risk sharing and facilitation. In the UK, the state plays a significant 
role in subsidising mortgage borrowing for working age people (for example, under Right to Buy schemes, Help 
to Buy, Funding for Lending scheme, Key Workers scheme, and so on). However, to date, the UK Government 
has relied largely on the financial services industry to manage the risks and costs of  equity lending in retirement. 
With policies geared towards encouraging more people to make use of  the equity tied up in their own homes, 
to support themselves and remain financially secure after retirement, there is a case to be made for the state to 
rethink its role in sharing some of  the risks associated with housing finance for older people.
Following recent proposals for a state-backed Equity Bank developed in collaboration with ILC-UK, there has also 
been renewed discussion about the role of  the UK government in equity release. This proposal suggested that 
the UK Government set up an ‘equity bank’, where homeowners exchange some of  the equity in their property 
for income or cash provided by a state-run bank (Mayhew and Smith, 2014). However, since this would amount 
to direct provision, in an environment where the state has clearly indicated that it prefers to play an enabling 
rather than providing role, it seems unlikely that it will be taken up. However, as the US, East Asian (and some 
European) examples demonstrate, there are a number of  alternative roles for the state to play, in better enabling 
the industry and consumers to manage retirement finance risks.
Nigel Waterson, Chair of  trade body the Equity Release Council, has also argued for the state to play a stronger 
awareness and education role: ‘There is undoubtedly a role for government to play, but instead of  taking on a 
provider’s responsibilities and the associated risks, we urge government to throw its support behind the industry 
and work to raise awareness and promote better understanding of  and access to equity release’. While there 
is merit in this proposal, we would propose that, given that perceptions of  poor value for money, rather than a 
lack of  awareness, appear to be a major contributing factor to relatively low take up of  equity release products 
(Chapter 2), an information-based strategy alone is unlikely to enable the sector to realise the full potential that 
this market holds.
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4.1 Retirement borrowing: demand
Demand for retirement borrowing in the UK is driven by demographic, political and socio-economic factors.  
The UK’s changing retirement landscape poses considerable challenges for older people to meet their own financial 
needs by effectively managing their income and assets over a longer period of  time. Our findings illustrate the 
enduring impact of  changes to the financial security of  older people (for example, changes to pension funding), and 
emerging risks such as the maturing of  interest-only mortgages, growing responsibility for social care and welfare 
needs in later life, as well as growth in consumer debt.
The development of, and demand for, innovative and flexible approaches to retirement products has been inhibited 
by a range of  factors, including the uncertainties resulting from the global financial crisis, economic recession and 
credit crunch, changing government policies in pensions and long-term care funding, and the reform of  financial 
services regulation. The current and future impact of  this changing environment on consumer behaviours is not 
yet fully understood: while there are early indications as to how people will respond to the removal of  the default 
retirement age, the end of  compulsory annuitisation, and changes to the tax structures affecting inheritance of  
pensions and housing equity, only time will tell how these developments will alter asset and income management 
in retirement in the medium term. Changing patterns of  debt accumulation and saving before retirement will also 
have a significant impact on future demand for retirement borrowing, with current evidence indicating general 
trends towards increased borrowing and decreased saving. Financial well-being amongst the current working-age 
population will be an important factor in driving future demand for retirement borrowing.
4.2 Retirement borrowing: supply
Our findings demonstrate that the current industry and regulatory environment for retirement borrowing 
does not adequately meet the needs of  our ageing population. There is an important role for the financial 
services industry in meeting consumer demand (appropriately informed by consumer needs), and for effective 
coordination between the industry, regulators and Government.
Housing needs
Improving the supply of  suitable housing for older people remains a key policy challenge. Meanwhile, the lack of  
feasible options for older people to downsize within the current housing market points to a continued need for 
borrowing options on existing properties to meet growing income needs and preferences.
Regulatory considerations
While the FCA is urging lenders to look more closely at their interpretation of  MMR rules to ensure they are 
delivering the right outcomes for consumers, the industry remains cautious about the risk of  breaching the 
conduct rules around affordability criteria.
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Although the MMR made a strong steer towards proof  of  pension income as a key element in stress-testing 
affordability for lending into retirement, the centrality of  pension income to overall financial wellbeing in later life 
has been overtaken by events, including the end of  compulsory annuitisation and increased flexibility in the form 
that wealth and asset holding in retirement can take. In addition to the potential prudential risk of  excluding credit-
worthy borrowers based on age, the IMLA has pointed to the impact of  refusing business based on pension 
income alone, rather than an holistic assessment of  affordability, with potentially adverse implications for the 
overall risk profile of  the loan book.
Wider barriers to retirement borrowing
Product-specific and regulatory barriers (as outlined in chapter two) have contributed to a considerable decrease 
in conventional mortgage borrowing in retirement. However, the development of  an effective and appropriate 
market for retirement borrowing must also be sensitive to contextual factors that are likely to affect access to 
financial services in later life such as: different levels of  financial capability and vulnerability; digital exclusion among 
older people; the effectiveness of  advice and guidance as the main source of  consumer protection for different 
types of  consumer; and debt aversion preventing take up of  potentially beneficial solutions to income needs.
The role of equity release in meeting drivers of demand for retirement borrowing
In a context of  growing demand, the exclusion of  older borrowers, especially older borrowers with lower incomes, 
from mainstream lending highlights the important role for specialised retirement borrowing options. At present, 
specialised lending provision is dominated by equity release, and within this, by lifetime mortgage products.
While the equity release sector has grown significantly in recent years, it remains small relative to mortgage 
lending, and there is a widespread view that the equity release market holds considerable untapped potential as a 
source of  retirement borrowing. Our findings identified the main supply-side and demand-side barriers to wider 
take-up and market growth. These include:
• A perceived need for greater flexibility and innovation in equity release products.
  For example, most equity release products carry a ‘no negative equity guarantee’ and other safeguards. 
Stakeholders have questioned the desirability of  a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to safeguards. However, further 
research would be needed to better understand consumers’ attitudes to equity release product features, and 
the extent to which they would be willing to trade off  certain safeguards for lower costs.
• The negative image associated with equity release.
  It has been suggested that a legacy of  poor products and mis-selling continues to fuel widespread distrust of  
equity release, with some stakeholders proposing a new approach to branding and advertising. It has also been 
suggested that a limited number of  providers, and particularly the lack of  high-street names that consumers 
relate to and trust, has adverse implications for consumer confidence, as well as reducing competitiveness. 
Research has shown that while consumers like the idea of  equity release in principle, many remain concerned 
that products are risky and offer poor value for money. An enduring demand-side barrier to equity release is 
a perception of  poor value for money. Although much of  the concern is based on a lack of  understanding of  
how the products work, efforts to counter this seem to have made relatively little difference so far.
The evolution of equity release?
With many older people unable to access conventional borrowing, the current equity release offer provides 
limited choice, with providers tending to offer limited flexible options for repayment, or to service interest,  
during the lifetime of  the loan. This can reduce the scope for borrowers to deploy their assets and income  
for multiple purposes over the longer term of  retirement, although a small number of  lenders have started to 
offer hybrid products (part-paid, part-rolled). We have also raised questions in relation to the decline of  the 
reversion market, with possible adviser and provider bias towards lifetime mortgages being one possible factor. 
Any discussion of  the evolution of  the equity release market should therefore give due consideration to the  
role of  reversions or other such equity loan schemes in meeting the needs of  those with a preference for  
non-mortgage based products.
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Lack of suitable financial products to enable people to plan ahead to manage their care costs
There are currently no products within the UK market to enable people to plan ahead for the costs of  social care, 
and very few options for meeting immediate care needs. The financial services industry has expressed a desire for 
government support to raise awareness of  the need for financial planning to cover care costs, but there remain 
significant gaps in understanding of  consumer preferences when it comes to care funding.
Following the Care Act 2014, the Government undertook to implement a new framework of  universal deferred 
payments to help people with covering social care costs without having to sell their homes in their lifetime. 
However, following concerns expressed by local authorities with regard to implementing the changes, the reforms 
proposed in the Care Act have now been delayed for the life of  the current Parliament, to 2020. Notwithstanding 
these delays, there may well be a growing need for the development of  housing equity product options to help 
pay for care costs.
The role of the UK Government and regulators in working effectively with the financial services industry to 
develop a suitable retirement borrowing market
The financial services industry has become firmly embedded as a key player in funding later life, but in Chapter 3 
we questioned the extent to which the industry is fully equipped (on its own) to deliver what is expected of  it. 
We provided several examples of  policy parameters being set without sufficient consideration for whether those 
responsible for delivery are capable of  doing so, or indeed whether they are being fully supported by the state 
to deliver policy goals effectively. In the UK, the state plays a significant role in subsidising mortgage borrowing 
for working age people (for example, through Right to Buy, Help to Buy, Funding for Lending and Key Workers 
Schemes), but it plays less of  a role in supporting retirement borrowing than some other countries do, for 
example, in equity release risk-sharing.
Similar questions can be raised with respect to the capacity of  the third sector and local government in this arena.  
In previous years, local authority partnership models such as the Home Improvement Trust were set up to 
provide equity-based loans for older homeowners, enabling them to repair, improve and adapt their homes. 
However, the recent, and considerable, imposition of  local government spending cuts forced the Trust to cease 
operating in 2013.
Situations like these, and the overseas examples outlined in Chapter 3, raise questions about what more the UK 
government, could, or should, do to enable individuals, the market, local authorities and the third sector to meet 
older people’s income, housing and care needs more effectively. Successful programmes operating in one country 
cannot always be easily transferred to the UK context, but there seems little to lose, and potentially much to gain, 
from an exploration of  the options and lessons that might be learned.
4.3 Gaps in the knowledge base
How are older people meeting their borrowing needs and preferences in retirement?
•	 There is relatively little evidence regarding what people do when excluded from conventional secured borrowing. 
Are people turning to:
 – equity release;
 – higher-cost, higher risk, options;
 – or are they going without?
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Product development
•	 What do consumers want and need? Is it better access to conventional mortgage borrowing, equity release,  
or something in between? There has been some development of  so-called hybrid products that offer a  
bridge between traditional lifetime mortgages where the debt rolls up over the course of  the loan, and those 
that allow interest to be part paid/part rolled, but we currently lack knowledge and understanding of  the 
appetite for these products. Are there other options? And what are the challenges with regard to funding  
and distribution?
•	 What are the particular features that would make retirement borrowing products more attractive, and what 
are people prepared to pay for?
Advice
•	 How do people make decisions about retirement income and assets, particularly in the pension  
freedom environment?
•	 What are the challenges in providing advice aligned with the changing pattern of  spending in retirement?
•	 How can holistic advice be given in a way that makes sense to the customer and engages them into thinking 
about their future tax, care costs and legal needs?
Greater risk sharing and a more joined up approach to borrowing in retirement
•	 What do stakeholders (i.e. government, regulators, and lenders) think about a more joined-up approach to 
retirement lending? Is there an appetite for risk-sharing options, to support better outcomes for consumers 
and to reduce costs and risks to lenders?
•	 What lessons can be learned from other countries where the state plays a more active role in encouraging and 
enabling the use of  housing equity in later life?
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